Social-Republican Property by Simon, William H.
Columbia Law School 
Scholarship Archive 
Faculty Scholarship Faculty Publications 
1992 
Social-Republican Property 
William H. Simon 
Columbia Law School, wsimon@law.columbia.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/faculty_scholarship 
 Part of the Law and Economics Commons, and the Property Law and Real Estate Commons 
Recommended Citation 
William H. Simon, Social-Republican Property, 38 UCLA L. REV. 1335 (1992). 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/faculty_scholarship/888 
This Essay is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Publications at Scholarship Archive. It has 
been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship by an authorized administrator of Scholarship Archive. For more 





Economic democracy is the idea that the norms of equality and
participation that classical liberalism confines to a narrowly defined
sphere of government should apply to the sphere of economic life.
Economic democracy thus entails a challenge to the classical liberal
notion of property. In classical liberalism, property defines a realm
of private enjoyment. No particular property right is a prerogative
of, or a prerequisite to, citizenship, and the exercise of property
rights by those who have them is not assessed in political terms.
One alternative to classical liberalism responsive to the ideal of
economic democracy is classical socialism. Classical socialism op-
poses to the liberal notion of private property the notion of state
property-property controlled by the officials of a democratically
constituted state. Another alternative to classical liberalism in-
spired in part by the ideal of economic democracy is social democ-
racy or welfare-regulatory liberalism. Social democracy retains the
classical liberal notion of private property rights, but it both quali-
fies them by regulatory restrictions on their exercise and supple-
ments them with welfare rights to minimal subsistence funded and
administered through a tax-transfer system.
* Professor of Law, Stanford University. I am grateful for support for work on
this essay from the John M. Olin Program in Law and Economics at Stanford Law
School and the Stanford Legal Research Fund, made possible by a bequest from Ira S.
Lillick and by gifts from other friends of the Stanford Law School. Thanks to many
friends for helpful advice. Extensive suggestions by Regina Austin, Barbara Fried, Ron
Gilson, Frank Michelman, Peggy Radin, and Sarah Ramsey are reflected throughout.
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This essay is about aspects of a further alternative to classical
liberalism inspired by the ideal of economic democracy. This alter-
native can be found in converging elements of the traditions of re-
publicanism and market socialism. Like social democracy, the
alternative rejects both state property and the unrestricted accumu-
lation and exercise of private property rights. However, to a greater
extent than social democracy, it pursues its concerns by encourag-
ing a politically desirable primary organization of economic activity
and distribution of income and wealth.
The distinctive notion of property in this alternative view is
sometimes called social property in the market socialist tradition,
but its simultaneous affinity with the republican tradition leads me
to call it social-republican property. The distinctive feature of so-
cial-republican property is that it is held by private individuals sub-
ject to two types of conditions-one requiring that the holder bear a
relation of potential active participation in a group or community
constituted by the property, and another designed to limit inequal-
ity among the members of a group or community. Among the more
familiar forms of social-republican property are interests in certain
producer cooperatives and "limited equity" housing cooperatives.
In contemporary American society, the characteristics associ-
ated with social-republican property are routinely imputed to a nar-
row set of political or citizenship entitlements, such as voting rights,
but these characteristics seem anomalous in private economic life.
Nevertheless, there are some interesting examples of social-republi-
can property in the private sphere, and there has recently been a
variety of proposals that would increase its importance there.
1
Moreover, a variety of regulatory and welfare policies, such as cer-
tain forms of tax relief and rent control, create interests that resem-
ble social-republican property and may be inspired by social-
republican principles.
This essay has both historical and political purposes. One his-
torical purpose is to clarify certain distinctive aspects of the republi-
can and market socialist traditions and to emphasize an affinity that
accounts for their frequent convergence in 19th century radicalism.
1. This essay has been influenced by the views on economic reform in R. UNGER,
FALSE NECESSITY: ANTI-NECESSITARIAN THEORY IN THE SERVICE OF RADICAL DE-
MOCRACY (1987), which is market socialist in tone, and M. PIORE & C. SABEL, THE
SECOND INDUSTRIAL DIVIDE: POSSIBILITIES FOR PROSPERITY (1985), which appeals
to republicanism. However, the idea of social-republican property is only implicit in
Piore and Sabel and is in some tension with parts of Unger's argument.
[Vol. 38:13351336
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Part I develops the notion of social-republican property as a heuris-
tic designed to serve this purpose.
Another historical purpose is to illustrate that, while social-
republican principles are usually treated as utopian and marginal in
American public discourse, there is in fact a wide variety of prop-
erty rights in the American economy that express such principles.
Parts II through IV thus survey some contemporary examples of
social-republican property in America (with some references to Eu-
rope for purposes of comparison).
The essay's political purpose is to contribute to contemporary
debates about radical economic reform, in particular to debates over
the possibility of a "third way" between capitalism (both its classi-
cal liberal and social democratic versions) and socialism. The so-
cial-republican vision may be the closest thing we have to a reform
model that is both distinguishable from the capitalist and socialist
models and at least moderately institutionally concrete.
To be sure, the sophisticated contemporary response to the
question of the "third way" is to assert the indeterminacy of all
general reform models, and to insist that any plausible program for
a particular economy would have to be an amalgam of a diverse
variety of forms of property. General models do not generate con-
crete programs by themselves, and no single general model could
plausibly serve as a unique inspiration for the restructuring of an
entire economy. Nevertheless, general models inescapably influence
even the most contextual thinking about particular reforms. Enlarg-
ing our repertory of general models thus seems likely to enhance the
flexibility of our thinking and the range of particular alternative
possibilities we can summon in appraising particular practices and
institutions.
Thus, the essay concludes in Part V with a tentative normative
appraisal of the social-republican vision. It defends social-republi-
can institutions against the charge that they have strong general
tendencies toward economic inefficiency. On the other hand, it con-
cedes that such institutions have a troubling tendency toward exclu-
siveness. The cultural exclusiveness attributed to republicanism in
some recent critiques has a counterpart in the economic logic of
social-republican property. Plausible applications of social-republi-
can principles would have to confine or neutralize this tendency.
1991] 1337
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I. REPUBLICANISM, MARKET SOCIALISM, AND PROPERTY
There are myriad versions of republicanism and of market so-
cialism.2 The ones of concern here share a commitment to partici-
pation and equality in the economic sphere, and a sympathetic
focus on small-scale, locally rooted enterprise. It would be a diffi-
cult task to disentangle republican from socialist rhetoric in the
many political movements that invoked these themes in middle and
late 19th century America and Europe. The themes were expressed
in terms that mix republican and socialist rhetoric in the labor radi-
calism of this period, for example, in the programs associated in
America with the Knights of Labor, in France with Pierre-Joseph
Proudhon, in Germany with Ferdinand Lassalle, and in the agra-
rian counterparts of these movements, such as the Farmers' Alli-
ance in America.3 Social-republican themes appear in more
distinctly republican rhetoric in the tradition of political thought
that J.G.A. Pocock has traced to James Harrington and which in-
fluenced the agrarian republicanism of the Jeffersonians and the
petty bourgeois strands of Jacksonian democracy, Whig political
economy, and the radical republicanism of the Civil War era.4 And
one can find overlapping themes in a more distinctly socialist rheto-
ric in the market socialist theories and programs developed since
the 1950s in Eastern Europe, especially in Yugoslavia.
5
Both republicanism and market socialism express or imply cri-
tiques of classical liberalism and corporate capitalism. They both
suggest that the ideal of democracy implicit in classical liberal social
arrangements is implausible because it tolerates too high a degree of
material inequality and too circumscribed a scope of participation
in decisions of collective significance. Moreover, both traditions
criticize classical liberalism for legitimating and fostering a narrow
egoism, which they see as a threat both to mutually beneficial coop-
2. See generally J. POCOCK, THE MACHIAVELLIAN MOMENT: FLORENTINE
POLITICAL THOUGHT AND THE ATLANTIC REPUBLICAN TRADITION (1975); Brus,
Market Socialism, in THE NEW PALGRAVE (J. Eatwell, M. Milgate & P. Newman eds.
1988).
3. See, e.g., E. BERNSTEIN, FERDINAND LASSALLE As A SOCIAL REFORMER
134-65 (1969); L. GOODWYN, THE POPULIST MOMENT: A SHORT HISTORY OF THE
AGRARIAN REVOLT IN AMERICA (1978); J. JOLL, THE ANARCHISTS 61-83 (1964) (on
Proudhon); B. LAURIE, ARTISANS INTO WORKERS: LABOR IN NINETEENTH CENTURY
AMERICA 141-75 (1989) (on the Knights of Labor).
4. For a survey of American developments, see B. LAURIE, supra note 3, at
47-140.
5. See, e.g., B. HORVAT, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF SOCIALISM: A MARKET
SOCIAL THEORY (1982); H. LYDALL, YUGOSLAV SOCIALISM: THEORY AND PRACTICE
(1984); M. MARKOVIC, DEMOCRATIC SOCIALISM: THEORY AND PRACTICE (1982).
[Vol. 38:13351338
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eration and to an ambitious conception of personal development
and expression.
Nineteenth-century and many later versions of republicanism
and market socialism converge on some specific points of political
economy that today seem dogmatic or confused, including a vision
of the macrodynamics of capitalism that asserts an inexorable ten-
dency toward increased inequality and volatility, a precapitalist
hostility to interest-taking, and a categorical denial of the produc-
tivity of economic intermediaries and many other white collar
occupations.
They also, however, converge on some points that retain con-
siderable force. One central point of convergence challenges the
line classical liberalism draws between public and private spheres.
The liberal public sphere is in principle a realm of equality and par-
ticipation; the liberal private sphere is in principle a realm of con-
tract in which people with unequal endowments exchange
productive efforts for consumption benefits. To republicans and
market socialists, this structure subverts democracy in two ways.
The wealthy can translate the resources acquired in the private
sphere into power in the public sphere in ways that undermine
equality and participation. At the same time, in the private sphere
of work (and to a more ambiguous extent, the sphere of consump-
tion) the nonwealthy are forced into experiences of dependence (to
use the republican term) and alienation (to use the socialist term)
that preclude personal and political autonomy.
The subordination that these doctrines deplore has several
dimensions. One dimension is simply the need of those who lack
property to submit to the often pervasive direction of those who
have it in order to earn their livings. Another is the degradation
and stultification that result from the need to spend nearly all one's
time focused anxiously on securing basic material subsistence, with
the consequence that one lacks the time and security to develop
broader capacities, including the capacity for effective political par-
ticipation. Still a third dimension is the way in which workers expe-
rience the operation of labor and capital markets as natural
processes beyond human control.6 This occurs both because impor-
tant social decisions have been removed from the agenda of collec-
tive deliberation and because the workers' experience as passive
6. The classic socialist text is Marx's chapter on the "fetishism of commodities,"
K. MARX, CAPITAL 163-77 (Penguin ed. 1976); the analogous republican analysis is
portrayed in J. POCOCK, supra note 2, at 423-505. Pocock notes the kinship of republi-
can and Marxist analyses. Id. at 505.
13391991]
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objects of economic forces undermines their capacity for autono-
mous participation in social decisions.
This critique of the private sphere expresses, not only opposi-
tion to inequality, but a commitment to public collective decision-
making over private individual decisionmaking. It tends to see
public collective decisionmaking as an expression of virtue and soli-
darity and hence both intrinsically more satisfying and conducive to
better decisions. It tends to see private individual decisionmaking
as an expression of corruption and alienation. Although the rela-
tions between institutions and attitudes are complex and often ob-
scure, there is one straightforward sense in which collective public
decisionmaking is associated with civic virtue and solidarity: it com-
pels the participants to address each other in terms that appeal to
common interests.
A further point of convergence of the republican and market
socialist critiques is the contention that a plausible conception of
democracy requires that political autonomy be grounded in the con-
trol of property, or more specifically, a particular kind of prop-
erty-productive resources, or capital. Classical liberalism seems to
deny political significance to the distribution of property; social
democratic liberalism seems to focus its concern on guaranteeing
the citizen a minimum level of consumption. In contrast, republi-
cans and market socialists see broadly distributed property as a
safeguard against the subversion of democracy by either a wealthy
oligarchy or an aggressive state.
The critical norm of republican political economy is propertied
independence--civic competence grounded in ownership of capi-
tal.7 The critical norm in market socialism is "social property"-
productive resources controlled by workers in a participatory work-
place but subject to important obligations to the larger society.
8
In addition to providing material security and protecting
against subordination to either wealthy individuals or an imper-
sonal market, social-republican property functions to promote polit-
ical responsibility. Since the value of property is affected by
collective decisions, property is a medium through which the conse-
quences of such decisions are transmitted to individual citizens.
7. See, e.g., J. POCOCK, supra note 2, at 407-09.
8. See B. HORVAT, supra note 5, at 235-59. My notion of the relation of republi-
canism and market socialism and the role of property in them is especially indebted to
W. SEWELL, WORK AND REVOLUTION IN FRANCE: THE LANGUAGE OF LABOR FROM
THE OLD REGIME TO 1848 (1980).
[Vol. 38:13351340
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Property thus serves as an inducement both to participate and to
avoid reckless or opportunistic behavior.
Social-republican property can be distinguished from the more
conventional notion of capital ownership, which might be called
"liberal private" property, by two features: first, transfer or aliena-
tion restraints that confine control of the property to active or po-
tentially active participants in a community constituted by the
property, and second, accumulation restraints designed to limit ine-
quality among members of such a community. These core features
of social-republican property operate as restraints on the com-
modification and capitalization of relationships. They restrict the
ability of the owner/citizen to fully monetize or liquidate her inter-
est or to convert anticipated future benefits into present lump sums.
They thus encourage the owner to view her interest as a stake in a
particular long-term relationship.
Alienation restraints may contribute to the maintenance of a
politically desirable distribution of wealth by preventing presump-
tively imprudent transfers likely to exacerbate disadvantage. They
also serve as safeguards of the propertied independence essential to
civic competence. We often think of alienation restraints on welfare
benefits like Social Security9 as purely paternalistic, but from a so-
cial-republican point of view they have a more complex character.
Like the prohibition against selling yourself into slavery, such re-
straints preclude individual choices, but they do so in the interest of
preserving the individual's capacity for choice. Transfer restrictions
also impede the formation of broad ranging markets that increase
economic volatility and hence undermine the security essential to
political autonomy. In addition, alienation restraints help confine
control rights to active participants in the community, and preclude
transfers that might threaten the social-republican character of the
community-notably transfers to absentee owners or "speculators."
An explicit, exacting alienation restraint would entirely pre-
clude individual members of the relevant community from transfer-
ring their property interests; a looser one would require the consent
of the other members. In Yugoslav market socialism, capital is con-
sidered "social property," a category that differs from Soviet-style
state property in that it contemplates that the possessors have broad
discretion over the employment of the capital and some claim to the
proceeds from it, but also differs from liberal private property partly




in being more or less categorically nontransferable.' 0 In America,
memberships in partnerships and cooperatives are typically not uni-
laterally transferable."I Small businesses of many varieties often re-
quire the consent of remaining owners for transfers of ownership
interests.
Another form of transfer restriction is a residency or usage re-
quirement that conditions property rights on the owner residing on
the property, making some productive use of it, or both. The law of
some of the American Colonies made extensive use of conditions of
occupation, settlement, and cultivation in defining both the acquisi-
tion and maintenance of land ownership; the Homestead Act of
1862 imposed settlement conditions on property interests in federal
grants of western lands; the "prior appropriation" system of water
law that predominates in the American West conditions ownership
of water rights on continued use. 12 In all these cases, the conditions
appear to have been influenced by republican notions. (But this is
not to say that they effectively implemented republican values; the
Homestead restrictions were weak and weakly enforced; in the
water law case, the recognition of corporate and absentee owners
permits the conditions to be satisfied in ways that subvert republi-
can goals.)
As either a substitute for or a complement of explicit transfer
restrictions, both republicans and market socialists have often fa-
vored investments in resources that are relatively immobile. Har-
rington considered land the resource most appropriate for
republican property:
Tho Riches in general have Wings and be apt to bate; yet those in
land are the most hooded, and ty'd to the Perch, whereas those
in Mony have the least hold, and are the swiftest of flight. 
13
10. C. PROUT, MARKET SOCIALISM IN YUGOSLAVIA 85-121 (1985).
11. See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 12410(a) (West 1991); UNIF. PARTNERSHIP ACT
§ 27 (1969).
12. See L. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 362-65 (1973); J. SAX &
R. ABRAMS, LEGAL CONTROL OF WATER RESOURCES 329-33, 399-405 (1986);
Mensch, The Colonial Origins of Liberal Property Rights, 31 BUFFALO L. REV. 635,
660-91 (1982). Transfer (and accumulation) restraints on property are often found in
preindustrial settings, and they survive in the legal regimes of indigenous tribal groups
in nations forcibly settled by westerners. See, e.g., McChesney, Government as Definer
of Property Rights: Indian Lands, Ethnic Externalities, and Bureaucratic Budgets, 19 J.
LEGAL STUD. 297, 312-15 (1990). Such restraints are also prominent in twentieth cen-
tury third world land reform programs. See, e.g., S. KLEIN, THE PATTERN OF LAND
TENURE REFORM IN EAST ASIA AFTER WORLD WAR II 20-21 (1958); S. SANDERSON,
LAND REFORM IN MEXICO 1910-1980 (1984).
13. J. HARRINGTON, The Prerogative of Popular Government, in THE POLITICAL
WORKS OF JAMES HARRINGTON 404 (J.G.A. Pocock ed. 1977).
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The preference for immobile property is based partly on its ten-
dency to be relatively stable in value, but more importantly on its
tendency to give the owner a stake in the community likely to moti-
vate political activity. Landowners, the French republican Anne
Robert Jacques Turgot wrote, "are attached to the land by virtue of
their property; they cannot cease to take an interest in the district
where it is placed .... It is the possession of land . . . which,
linking the possessor to the State, constitutes true citizenship. .. "
By contrast, proprietors of liquid, mobile capital "belong to no
place." 14
Nineteenth century theorists expanded the category of republi-
can property, first to artisanal tools (and, inferentially, to skills) and
then to small-scale industrial capital held by owner-operators. The
theorists emphasized the politically significant qualities these forms
of property shared with agricultural land1'5-they were equally
compatible with production by owners working at their own direc-
tion, and they were rooted in face-to-face local economic rela-
tions. 16 Their immobility arose from the fact that their value
depended heavily on the local presence of collaborators and custom-
ers. Thus, in addition to providing the material security needed for
political independence, this type of property encouraged coopera-
tion and fostered trust in a way that enhanced the people's capaci-
ties as citizens.
The two types of property most prominently condemned as in-
compatible with republican politics were financial property (securi-
ties) and slaves. Aside from the fact that they explicitly constituted
subordination (of the wage-earner to the distant capitalist in the one
case, of the slave to the master in the other), what these types of
property had in common was their relative mobility. The tradi-
tional socialist and republican hostility to financiers, as well as to
speculators and other intermediaries, is grounded in part on the no-
tion that they introduce a degree of liquidity into economic rela-
14. Quoted in W. SEWELL, supra note 8, at 127-28.
15. See D. MONTGOMERY, BEYOND EQUALITY: LABOR AND THE RADICAL
REPUBLICANS 1862-1872, at 14-25 (1967); S. WILENTZ, CHANTS DEMOCRATIC: NEW
YORK AND THE RISE OF THE AMERICAN WORKING CLASS 1788-1850, at 93-94
(1984).
16. Hired workers in artisanal workshops or small businesses might be considered
independent to the extent that their status was transitional or was mitigated by strong
informal bonds of mutual duty and respect. See, e.g., S. WILENTZ, supra note 15, at 94
("the dependence of journeymen and apprentices - in principle a temporary condition
- was tempered by their possession of a skill and graced with the affection and respect
of the masters, in ... a web of 'reciprocal' obligation").
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tions that threatens the political structure of the community.
Socialists and republicans attributed an astonishing range of mor-
ally corrosive effects to engagement in far-flung financial markets,
including fraud and sexual licentiousness, most of which they ex-
plained at least in part by the failure of such property to anchor the
individual in a local political community.
17
And one reason why republicans considered black slavery a
threat to the independence of whites was that the comparative mo-
bility of slaves as opposed to landed property discouraged slave-
holders from making material or personal investments in local
communities, and encouraged them to oppose politically the types
of public investments necessary to a vital public culture. With their
wealth in slave property, owners tended to treat land as a variable
cost, cultivate extensively, and then move on as soil productivity
declined, without developing local attachments.
s
Here the republican perspective resembles a notion contempo-
rary economists associate with Albert Hirschman-that impedi-
ments to easy exit from a community create inducements for
internal participation in efforts to improve the community.
19 Fixed,
locally rooted investments create such impediments (without di-
rectly or categorically infringing liberty of personal movement).
The second distinctive feature of social-republican property in-
volves restraints on accumulation designed to preserve equality.
The classical republican instance of such restraints is the "agrarian
law" of the Roman Republic that constrained (to a limited and dis-
puted extei-..) the amount of land that a citizen could acquire.
20 A
central part of the constitution of Harrington's utopian Oceana was
an agrarian law requiring the equal division of property among
heirs at death and precluding citizens from acquiring during their
17. See, e.g., H. CAREY, THE HARMONY OF INTERESTS, AGRICULTURAL, MANU-
FACTURING, AND COMMERCIAL 202-09 (1872). See generally P. CONKIN, PROPHETS
OF PROSPERITY: AMERICA'S FIRST ECONOMISTS 171-307 (1980).
18. H. CAREY, THE SLAVE TRADE: DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN, WHY IT EXISTS,
AND How IT MAY BE EXTINGUISHED 35-43, 52-74 (1853). This analysis proved pre-
scient. After the Civil War, when landholding replaced slaveholding as the preeminent
economic activity, investment in towns and associated economic infrastructure in-
creased dramatically. "Since land was fixed in place," the economist Gavin Wright
concludes, "what occurred was a pronounced localization of economic life." G.
WRIGHT, OLD SOUTH, NEW SOUTH: REVOLUTIONS IN THE SOUTHERN ECONOMY
SINCE THE CIVIL WAR 34 (1986).
19. A. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE AND LOYALTY: RESPONSES TO DECLINE IN
FIRMS, ORGANIZATIONS AND STATES (1970).




lifetimes more land than the amount that would generate income of
2000 pounds per year.
21
Accumulation restraints figured commonly in 19th century re-
form models. To take one of the more radical examples, Thomas
Skidmore, who influenced labor activists in New York in the 1830s,
proposed a system under which property could be held privately
only as a life estate, would revert to the state upon the holder's
death, and would be redistributed each generation to young people
in roughly equal allotments.22 A comparatively moderate instance
was the provision (ineffectively enforced) of the Homestead Act of
1862 limiting the amount of public lands that might be acquired to
a quarter section per claimant. 23 The Federal Reclamation Act of
1902 imposed a limitation (much evaded and recently liberalized) of
160 acres on the size of individual holdings that might benefit from
federally subsidized water.
24
A different type of accumulation restraint is expressed in the
market socialist notion of "social property." Under this notion, in-
dividuals have claims on the income of the enterprise in which they
work, but they cannot either individually or collectively sell the en-
terprise or its assets. I mentioned this above as a transfer restraint,
but it can also be seen as an accumulation constraint. It prevents
worker/owners from capitalizing the anticipated future income of
the enterprise. As in Skidmore's conception, their ownership inter-
est is in the nature of a life estate-here the "life" being their mem-
bership tenure in the enterprise-though in market socialism the
remainder interest is typically ascribed to the enterprise and its fu-
ture members rather than, as Skidmore proposed, to the state.
25
A further type of accumulation restraint limits the degree of
inequality within an enterprise. A strict constraint would provide
equal rights of control and income for each member of the enter-
prise. Contemporary American partnership law presumes this in
the absence of contrary agreement for members of a partnership. 26
21. J. HARRINGTON, The Commonwealth of Oceana, in THE POLITICAL WORKS
OF JAMES HARRINGTON, supra note 13, at 231.
22. P. CONKIN, supra note 17, at 237-40.
23. L. FRIEDMAN, supra note 12, at 363.
24. J. SAX & R. ABRAMS, supra note 12, at 628-29.
25. Social property is often analogized to the Roman civil-law concept of ususfruc-
tus: "The right to use (uti, ius utendi) another's property and to take produce (fructus)
therefrom (iusfruendi), without impairing (i.e., destroying, diminishing, or deteriorat-
ing) its substance .... As a strictly personal right the ususfructus is neither transferable
nor alienable." A. BERGER, ENCYCLOPEDIC DICTIONARY OF ROMAN LAW 755 (1953).
26. UNIF. PARTNERSHIP ACT §§ 18(a), 18(e) (1969).
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Early American corporate charters commonly limited inequality by
capping the number of votes a single shareholder could exercise.2"
Some republican and market socialist programs mandate equal con-
trol and severely limit income inequality. 28
Yet another type of accumulation restraint common to many
social-republican programs works indirectly and prospectively.
This type includes arrangements involving insurance or cross-col-
lateralization. Nineteenth century labor organizations, for example,
often sought to provide health and unemployment insurance to
their members. Many such programs were not funded on an actua-
rial basis and contemplated future charges on the more successful
members to meet the needs of the others.29 Analogous accumula-
tion constraints were imposed by arrangements in which groups of
worker-entrepreneurs would jointly guarantee or collateralize
credit. The legendary Farmer's Alliance program provided for co-
operatives to purchase farm supplies with "joint notes" secured by
mortgages of members' farms. Each farmer's wealth was thus made
subject to creditor claims in the event that any of them should
default. 30
In the small-firm industrial districts of the "Third Italy" that
achieved dramatic success in the 1970s, among the various types of
interfirm cooperatives-many of them sponsored by the Communist
and Socialist parties-are credit cooperatives based on the cross-
collateralization idea. The cooperatives, which are funded by mem-
bership fees and public subsidies, issue loan guarantees to their
members that enable them to secure otherwise unavailable commer-
27. E. DODD, AMERICAN BUSINESS CORPORATIONS UNTIL 1860, WITH SPECIAL
REFERENCE TO MASSACHUSSEIFS 250, 259-60 (1954) (Middlesex Canal charter of
1795 provided for 800 shares and voting "by shares with a 25 vote maximum"; Franklin
Railroad Company charter of 1830 provided for 5000 shares with no shareholder to
have more than 10 votes).
28. See infra text accompanying notes 121-126.
29. I J. COMMONS, HISTORY OF LABOR IN THE UNITED STATES 83-85, 578-80
(1918); M. KELLER, THE LIFE INSURANCE ENTERPRISE 1885-1910, at 10 (1962).
30. L. GOODWYN, supra note 3, at 74-80.
The cross-collateralization idea has recently become prominent in discussions of
economic development in poor countries, in part as a result of its successful use by the
Grameen Bank in Bangladesh. The bank makes individual "micro-enterprise" loans
sequentially to members of small support groups who are jointly responsible for repay-
ment. See M. HOSSAIN, CREDIT FOR ALLEVIATION OF RURAL POVERTY (1988). Al-
bert Hirschman recounts how a series of jointly guaranteed loans to members of groups
of bicycle-riding delivery workers in the Dominican Republic led to the creation of a
substantial organized social movement. A. HIRSCHMAN, GETTING AHEAD COLLEC-
TIVELY: GRASSROOTS EXPERIENCES IN LATIN AMERICA 14-16 (1984).
[Vol. 38:13351346
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cial bank financing. 31 Another area in which the cross-collateral-
ization approach appears today is cooperative (as opposed -to
condominium) housing, where individual owners typically pledge
their ownership interests as security for their neighbors', as well as
their own, debts.
32
Finally, the hostility in social-republican discourse to the cor-
porate form of economic organization reflects in part the equality
concerns underlying accumulation constraints. A central objection
is that the corporation's ability to aggregate resources of far-flung
absentee owners gives it political and economic advantages over lo-
cal worker-owners. It can bring its outside resources to bear in the
local political community in ways that give it disproportionate
power. And because corporate owners are typically "absentees,"
they largely escape the local social externalities of their economic
conduct (for example, unemployment and pollution), and thus are
inclined to engage in activities that are inefficient in terms of the
larger interests of the community. And social-republican rhetoric
associates the corporate form with monopolistic market power that
unfairly stifles local competition and exploits local business custom-
ers and suppliers. 33 Thus, limitations and prohibitions of corporate
business and political activity may be seen as social-republican ac-
cumulation restraints.
34
The equality commitment creates an important tension within
republicanism. Historically, republicans have been ambivalent as to
31. M. BEST, THE NEW COMPETITION: INSTITUTIONS OF INDUSTRIAL RESTRUC-
TURING 214-16 (1990).
32. J. DUKEMINER & J. KRIER, PROPERTY 401-02 (1981).
33. For social-republican accounts of the success of large-scale corporate capital in
gaining disproportionate influence in state and local political processes, see C. WOOD-
WARD, ORIGINS OF THE NEW SOUTH, 1877-1913 (1951); J. GAVENTA, POWER AND
POWERLESSNESS (1980). Gaventa's book also illustrates the theme that associates neg-
ative social externalities such as pollution and degraded working conditions with corpo-
rate economic activity. The railroad companies were the most prominent protagonists
in the social-republican conception of predatory competition. See, e.g., Frank Norris's
novel, The Octopus (published in 1901), and for a contemporary perspective critical of
the social-republican approach, Hovenkamp, Regulatory Conflict in the Gilded Age:
Federalism and the Railroad Problem, 97 YALE L.J. 1017 (1988).
34. At various times since the late nineteenth century several states have prohibited
farming or ownership of farm land by corporations, and several such provisions have
been enacted in recent years. Such prohibitions are generally understood to reflect a
social-republican aversion to "absentee owners." MSM Farms, Inc. v. Spire, 927 F.2d
330 (8th Cir. 1991) (sustaining Nebraska prohibition against due process and equal pro-
tection challenges). These laws sometimes make exceptions for, among others, corpora-
tions whose owners satisfy residency requirements. E.g., MINN. STAT. §§ 500.24(2)(d),
(3)(b) (1990) (prohibition not applicable to corporation, where, among other require-
ments, holder of majority of shares resides on farm or is actually engaged in farming).
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whether just distribution of property should be treated as a subject
of politics or as a prerequisite to it. The prominence of equality in
the republican vision suggests that it should be a focus of ongoing
political debate and action. But to many republicans, fundamental
distributive struggles entail an aggressive factionalism inimical to
the spirit of civic virtue that republican politics requires, and strong
equality commitments pose the threat of requiring an excessively
powerful state. Thus, some have argued that republican politics is
possible only after fundamental distributive issues have been settled,
so that redistributive claims can be excluded from the political
agenda. Many republicans, even some as radical as Tom Paine,
have opposed ambitious redistribution schemes.
35
A frequent republican strategy of compromise-common to
ancient Rome, revolutionary France and America, and 19th cen-
tury America (as reflected in the minor land reform efforts of Re-
construction and the Homestead Act)-has been to focus efforts to
achieve economic equality on the distribution of land conquered
from outsiders or confiscated from the losing side in civil wars.
36
Today, explicit accumulation restraints on capital arise most coin-
See K. MEYER, D. PEDERSON, N. THORSON & J. DAVIDSON, AGRICULTURAL LAW
44-48 (1985).
Another contemporary expression of wariness about corporations is the limitation
in campaign finance laws on political contributions by corporations. See First National
Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 778-83 (1978). In the early nineteenth century, social-
republican concerns fueled the ultimately unsuccessful opposition to "general" incorpo-
ration procedures that made the form liberally available. See J. HURST, THE LEGITI-
MACY OF THE BUSINESS CORPORATION IN THE LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 15-57
(1970).
35. E.g., H. ARENDT, ON REVOLUTION 53-110 (1965) (successful republicanism
requires the removal of basic distributive issues from the political agenda); E. FONER,
TOM PAINE AND REVOLUTIONARY AMERICA 249-52 (1976) (discussing Paine's ambiv-
alent rejection of radical redistribution).
36. The strong emphasis on membership in republicanism gives it a simultaneous
affinity with positions that seem more conservative and more radical than contemporary
mainstream political discourse. The proposition that meaningful citizenship entails
property could be interpreted to imply as readily that those who lack property should be
excluded from citizenship as that all citizens are entitled to property. See Michelman,
Possession Versus Distribution in the Constitutional Idea of Property, 72 IOWA L. REV.
1319, 1330-34 (1987) (discussing "exclusionary" and "inclusionary" republican appeals
to equality).
Thus, in the antebellum era, republican rhetoric appealed both to slaveholders,
who could argue (with ample classical precedent) that freeing citizens for politics re-
quired the relegation of mundane work to a permanently subservient noncitizen class,
and radical agrarians, who argued for the expropriation and redistribution of land in a
way that would guarantee each citizen a roughly equal freehold. In the Reconstruction
era, the combination of a redistributive interpretation of propertied independence and
universal citizenship generated the most radical (and quickly disappointed) visions of
emancipation, those that held that the grant of citizenship to blacks should include
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monly as conditions on government or charitable grants, or on ex-
emptions from taxes or regulations.
The tension over redistribution has been avoided in the social-
ist tradition by a relatively unqualified commitment to equality, but
this commitment has been made at the cost of the plausibility of the
doctrine. The failure to recognize the political dangers of charging
the state with a strong permanent mission of economic leveling, and
of making leveling a preeminent focus of politics, are among the
most important reasons for the increasingly widespread rejection of
socialism.
Thus, a critical task of a plausible vision of social-republican
property is to reconcile its commitment to equality with a decentral-
ized institutional structure and a political culture that recognizes
the importance of distribution without being obsessed with it.
The social-republican vision and its notion of property are not
always distinguishable from social democratic notions that have
played a prominent role in mainstream thought throughout most of
this century. Social democracy also has ambitious aspirations for
equality and democracy. Moreover, it has proposed conceptions of
property, not only in welfare benefits and regulatory fairness, but in
membership in public and private institutions, including the work-
place, that overlap with social-republican property. 37 Nevertheless,
the distinction between the social democratic and social-republican
visions is worth drawing.
In contrast to social-republicans, social democrats tend to fo-
cus their egalitarian and democratic concerns on regulatory and
tax-transfer structures rather than on the structure of the primary
processes of production and exchange. Their efforts to limit ine-
quality in the primary distribution of wealth tend to stop after the
equitable provision of education and the limitation of inheritance.
Social democrats tend to believe that the ownership of capital, once
the powers of ownership have been shrunk by their transfer and
regulatory apparatus, is of relatively slight political importance.
They are less likely than social-republicans to see the sphere of pro-
duction as a realm of political expression. When they do attempt to
apply democratic and egalitarian norms to the workplace, they are
likely to prefer models of unionization and collective bargaining in
something like General Sherman's "40 acres and a mule." See E. FONER, RECON-
STRUCTION: AMERICA'S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION 1863-1877, at 233-36 (1988).
37. See Pound, The New Feudalism, 35 COMM. L.J. 397 (1930) (membership




investor-owned or state-owned firms to models of worker
o w n ersh ip -*
Finally, social democrats tend to be relatively sympathetic to
large-scale enterprise and concentrated capital (subject to regula-
tory restrictions and worker collective bargaining rights) and to find
the social-republican vision of small-scale, owner-managed enter-
prise anachronistic and unattractive. 38 While there may be some
room in the social democratic view for social-republican property,
such property plays a more marginal role there.
II. SOCIAL-REPUBLICAN PROPERTY IN LIBERAL SOCIETY:
RIGHTS OF CITIZENSHIP
Contemporary American legal and political culture is neither
socialist nor republican. The prominent conceptions of property in
the culture are classical liberal or social democratic rather than so-
cial-republican.
There is, however, an important core of rights where liberal
culture tends both to impose alienation and accumulation restraints
and to justify these restraints in the same political terms as republi-
canism and market socialism. These are the rights associated with
"citizenship," understood in its popular rather than its technical
legal meaning to denote the minimal rights of membership in the
community. These rights include the right to remain in the coun-
try, the right to the protection of the laws, and the right to vote in
elections to government office.
39
Many would add further rights, but this short list is not con-
troversial as far as it goes, and it is not controversial that these core
citizenship rights are constituted with strong alienation and ac-
38. For illustrations of the social democratic vision, see R. CROSMAN, THE FU-
TURE OF SOCIALISM (1956); J. RAwLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 274-84 (1972). The
social democratic vision is in contrast to something like what I call the social-republican
one in R. UNGER, supra note 1, at 585-86, and the distinction parallels Piore's 
and
Sabel's contrast between "international Keynesianism" and "flexible specialization," M.
PIORE & C. SABEL, supra note 1, at 251-80. For characteristic social democratic 
criti-
ques of worker ownership, see H. CLEGG, A NEW APPROACH TO INDUSTRIAL 
DEMOC-
RACY, 19-30 (1960); S. PERLMAN, A THEORY OF THE LABOR MOVEMENT, 
ch. VI
(1908).
39. Only the latter right is uniquely associated with the technical definition of citi-
zenship; residence is accorded to lawful "permanent residents," and most of the 
ele-
ments of legal protection are accorded even to visiting aliens, but the lay and legal
definition of citizenship connotes at least these three rights (plus some additional ele-
ments such as jury service and opportunities to hold public office). See Schuck, Mem-
bership in the Liberal Polity: The Devaluation of American Citizenship, 3 GEO. IMMIGR.
L.J. 1, 2-9 (1989).
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cumulation restraints. Although the right to remain in the United
States is notably scarce in the economic sense and would undoubt-
edly command a substantial price were it marketable, holders of the
right cannot transfer it. (They can renounce or forfeit it, though
this is not easy for citizen holders to do.) There is no way to ac-
quire more than one American citizenship. And with a few excep-
tions, American citizenship requires forgoing citizenship rights in
other nations 40 The right of legal protection is also nontransferable
and is defined in terms of equality-as a right to legal treatment on
terms comparable to those on which other citizens are treated.4'
Voting rights associated with citizenship are also strongly non-
transferable (though not nonforfeitable). In general, voting rights
must be exercised by the holder herself in person; proxies are pre-
cluded. 42 The purchase and sale of votes is typically defined as
criminal, often in distinctively republican rhetoric as "corruption of
voters."' 43 And of course, voting rights typically must be allocated
on the basis of "one man [sic], one vote," a principle that requires
within limits that the electoral process be structured so that voters
have equal influence."
Citizenship rights are allocated through a political/legal pro-
cess that emphasizes criteria of familial and geographical proximity.
People can acquire citizenship automatically by being born within
the territory of the country regardless of their family relationships,
or by being born to citizen parents regardless of where. The natu-
ralization criteria are more complex, but they too emphasize kin-
ship and geographical proximity (prolonged residence).
45
40. 8 U.S.C. § 1448 (1988) (naturalization requires renunciation of foreign citizen-
ship); 8 U.S.C. § 1481 (1988) (citizenship forfeited by, inter alia, foreign naturalization).
41. Schuck, supra note 39, at 2-9.
42. 26 AM. JUR. 2D Elections § 235 (1966); see also Lucas v. Forty-Fourth General
Assembly, 377 U.S. 713 (1964) (suggesting that rights to a fairly apportioned legislature
are inalienable by holding unconstitutional a malapportioned legislature despite ap-
proval by a majority of the disadvantaged voters).
43. E.g., CAL. ELEC. CODE § 29620 (Deering 1977).
44. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
Citizenship also entails duties, notably of military service, that are typically defined
as nontransferable and with a concern for equality of sacrifice. Social-republican con-
cerns were prominent in the critique during the Civil War era of the provision allowing
conscripts to pay a "substitute," and in the contemporary critique of the volunteer
army. At least in wartime, the idea of a nontransferable duty of military service seems
to command a broad consensus. For an excellent discussion of this and related issues
concerning inalienability, see Rose-Ackerman, Inalienability and the Theory of Property
Rights, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 931, 961-68 (1985).
45. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1151-1182, 1429 (1988).
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Another set of basic and uncontroversial rights associated with
citizenship are rights of "free labor." These rights are reflected in
the thirteenth amendment prohibition of "involuntary servitude,"
the statutory criminalization of "peonage," and the common law's
refusal to specifically enforce "personal service" contracts. 46 The
"free labor" idea is associated with notions of minimal equality, and
it could be characterized as imposing an accumulation restraint that
limits a person's powers of direct physical coercion to the labor of a
single person, herself.
It also involves an indirect but quite pointed set of transfer re-
straints. The "free labor" norms do not simply prohibit the coer-
cive imposition of slavery or peonage; they deny enforceability to
these relations even where the worker has agreed to them. (Indeed
that is the only point of the peonage doctrine, since in the absence
of worker agreement the conduct it prohibits would violate general
criminal law and tort law prohibitions.) The prohibition of "invol-
untary" servitude thus actually precludes ostensibly voluntary ar-
rangements by making the worker's free labor rights inalienable.
Now consider rights to education. By statute or constitution,
education is a universal entitlement in all states and an occasional
subject of special federal constitutional solicitude.47 Universal pub-
lic education was a central plank of the nineteenth century social-
republican platform, and it continues to be seen today as an element
of civic capacity and political autonomy. Nevertheless, the rights
structure of education only partly and ambivalently expresses so-
cial-republican concerns. On one hand, rights to public education
are defined in terms of strong alienation and accumulation re-
straints. Residents of school age are entitled to public education in
their communities; this entitlement cannot be transferred to outsid-
ers, and is subject to constitutional and statutory equality
requirements.4
8
On the other hand, the practical significance of these transfer
and accumulation restraints is reduced by a parallel system of pri-
vate education operated in part on market principles. The private
system is in tension with social-republican norms for two reasons.
First, it facilitates the intergenerational transmission of privilege,
46. U.S. CONsT. amend. XIII; 42 U.S.C. § 1994 (1988); A. FARNSWORTH, CON-
TRACTS § 836 (1982).
47. E.g., Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982). But see San Antonio Indep. School
Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973) (denying that education is a "fundamental inter-
est" for equal protection purposes).
48. E.g., Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 487 P.2d 1241, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601 (1971).
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notably differential economic and political capacity, by allowing the
well-off to purchase education for their children not available to the
less advantaged. Second, it detaches the provision of education
from the process of governance. This means that the provision of
educational services does not act as a solvent of political commu-
nity. High quality private education, unlike public education, does
not tend to bond members to the community, and the availability of
private alternatives undercuts incentives for citizens to respond to
poor quality public education by the kind of political activity that
improves the quality of the community generally. On the private
educational market, citizens make inarticulate, low-visibility
choices inspired by their conceptions of their children's private
interests.
Thus, proposals to further privatize public education through
publicly funded vouchers redeemable at both public and private
schools are troubling in social-republican terms. The least troubling
voucher schemes retain accumulation constraints-by providing for
vouchers of equal value, by requiring participating schools to accept
them as full payment, and by prohibiting explicit or implicit dis-
crimination against applicants on the basis of socioeconomic char-
acteristics. The vouchers are also nontransferable in the sense that
they cannot be redeemed for cash or anything other than education.
However, by making the vouchers negotiable across political juris-
dictions and in the private market, the system uncouples education
from politics and the exercise of citizenship. 49
One analysis of alienation and accumulation restraints on citi-
zenship rights associates them with paternalism. From this per-
spective, the restraints reflect the belief that individual decisions to
alienate these rights are so likely to be mistaken and contrary to the
interests of those making the decisions that they should be prophy-
lactically precluded. However, this view ignores the really distinc-
tive aspect of citizenship rights-that they define membership in the
community. This means that the goods they protect are in part col-
lective goods, elements of a common culture in which everyone has
a stake. Moreover, it means that these rights are constitutive more
than instrumental-that is, they are components of the background
49. See generally J. COONS & S. SUGARMAN, EDUCATION BY CHOICE: THE CASE
FOR FAMILY CONTROL (1978); for a republican critique, see B. BARBER, STRONG DE-
MOCRACY: PARTICIPATORY POLITICS FOR A NEW AGE 293-98 (1984). A different ap-
proach to the unresponsiveness of public educational bureaucracies that is more
consistent with social-republican principles is the decentralization to the neighborhood
level along lines recently tried in Miami and Chicago. Wilkerson, New School Term
Puts Parents in the Seat of Power, N.Y. Times, Sept. 3, 1989, § 1, at 1, col. 1.
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autonomy necessary to regard someone as capable of meaningful
decisions.50
Where mainstream liberal views differ from social-republican
ones is over the scope of the appropriate sphere of rights of this
kind. American legal culture tends to treat property ownership
largely as a constraint on politics and not as a prerequisite to polit-
ical participation. Constitutional law creates no rights of minimal
access to capital or income for the nonwealthy; it imposes almost no
constraints on the exercise of ownership powers by the wealthy, and
it substantially restricts legislative efforts to limit such powers.
5 1
In the realm of common-law and statutory interpretation, the
legal culture tends to employ presumptions that legitimate and fa-
cilitate the political subordination of the propertyless to the proper-
tied, as, for example, in the doctrines that presume that employees
may be dismissed at will or that employers need not bargain with
unions over matters "at the core of entrepreneurial control."
52
Here too there is a commitment to freedom of transfer that takes
the form sometimes of a presumption of transferability and some-
times of active hostility to restraints on transfer, notably in the doc-
trine that some broad but ill-defined set of "restraints on alienation"
is void as against public policy.
53
Moreover, even when the culture accepts measures compatible
with the social-republican approach, it tends to explain these meas-
ures in liberal or social democratic terms rather than social-republi-
can ones. For example, when the Supreme Court upheld a
Minnesota statute providing for a moratorium on mortgage foreclo-
sures-a classic debtor-protection measure from the 19th century
social-republican repertory-it justified the measure, not in terms of
the preservation of propertied independence or the adjustment of
power between individual freeholding debtors and large institu-
tional creditors, but as a welfare measure designed to protect
50. Rose-Ackerman offers from a mainstream liberal perspective a related analysis
of voting as a collective good. See Rose-Ackerman, supra note 44, at 966-67.' How-
ever, the idea of a collective interest in voting seems to me to fit better in a social-
republican perspective. See Michelman, Conceptions of Democracy in American Consti-
tutional Argument: Voting Rights, 41 U. FLA. L. REV. 443, 483-86 (1989).
51. See, e.g., Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704 (1987); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1
(1976); Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist., 410 U.S. 719 (1973).
52. E.g., Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203, 223 (1964) (Stew-
art, J., concurring); Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 47 Cal. 3d 654, 765 P.2d 373, 254
Cal. Rptr. 211 (1988).
53. E.g., Wellenkamp v. Bank of America, 21 Cal. 3d 943, 582 P.2d 970, 148 Cal.
Rptr. 379 (1978); Jacobs v. Klawans, 225 Md. 147, 169 A.2d 677 (1961).
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against homelessness. 54 When it upheld the National Labor Rela-
tions Act, it spoke' not of the institutionalization of democratic val-
ues in the workplace, but of the promotion of productive efficiency
through "industrial peace." 55
The anomaly of social-republican property in American legal
culture is further reflected in the difficulty of securely establishing
some of the stronger forms of it. In its classic form, as exemplified
by the Yugoslav industrial sector, social-republican capital is sub-
ject to control by the members of the enterprise and to their rights
to income derived with it, but not to private appropriation by the
members. Efforts to create such interests on a permanent basis in
America risk being struck down as "inconvenient fetterings of prop-
erty" under the rule against perpetuities and under trust doctrines
requiring that there be a definite beneficiary for interests such as the
residual interest in enterprise capital.56
Significantly, the major exemption from these obstacles is for
charitable organizations; here the perpetuities rule is suspended and
the attorney general is charged with enforcing the prohibition
against private appropriation in the absence of a definite beneficiary.
However, social-republican organizations are typically denied these
exemptions on the ground that, since their economic benefits go pri-
marily to their members, their purposes are insufficiently "public"
to count as charitable. 57 Since there are legal techniques for cir-
cumventing the obstacles posed by these doctrines,58 their impor-
tance is less practical than expressive. They reflect the culture's
premise that the organization of productive relations is not a matter
of "public" concern and its discomfort with property that is neither
54. Home Building & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934).
55. NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 45 (1937).
56. II W. FRATCHER, ScoTr ON TRUSTS § 119 (4th ed. 1987); RESTATEMENT OF
PROPERTY §§ 370, 371, 380 (1944); RESTATEMENT OF TRUSTS § 112 (1935).
57. IVa W. FRATCHER, supra note 56, § 375.2; RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY
§ 398 (1944); and cases cited in IVa W. FRATCHER, supra note 56, § 375.2 n.69.
58. For example, the limitations on appropriation can be imposed by organizing as
corporations both a private governmental or charitable enforcing entity and the benefi-
ciary enterprise, and then either having the beneficiary contractually agree to limitations
on distributions, or giving the enforcing entity voting rights in the beneficiary corpora-
tion that enable it to veto distributions. Since corporations are accorded presumptively
perpetual life, and the perpetuities rule does not apply to contractual interests, these
approaches avoid the perpetuities problem (though they do not create self-enforcing
restrictions on specific property). As a practical matter, trusts, deed restrictions, and
leases (which can create self-enforcing restrictions on specific property) that are subject
to the perpertuities rule will often suffice, since restrictions limited to periods within the
rule often adequately serve the grantor's social-republican purposes. The problem of
*structuring enforceable equity limitations is discussed further at infra note 78.
1991] 1355
UCLA LAW REVIEW
entirely subject to private appropriation nor held in trust for some
general public.
Nevertheless, although social-republican property deviates
from the core conceptions of property, there is a significant variety
of examples of it in the culture. The next two sections give
illustrations.
III. RIGHTS ASSOCIATED WITH RESIDENCE
Political communities are defined geographically in terms of
residence. However, in a liberal polity, residence does not connote
property ownership, even for citizens; legal residence has come to
mean largely a state of mind-an "intention to remain" within the
jurisdiction. This much is enough to entitle the citizen to exercise
narrowly defined political rights of citizenship, but citizenship enti-
tles the citizen to not much more than these rights.
Nevertheless, the social-republican argument that political par-
ticipation without property cannot be fully meaningful to the indi-
vidual or salutary for the society retains some strength. People still
require property as a practical means for both effective participation
and enjoyment of the fruits of participation. Consider an argument
that Robert Ellickson has made recently in the very un-social-re-
publican language of public choice theory. 59 If people succeed
through political action in improving their communities then, to the
extent outsiders share their values and local housing supply is in-
elastic, much of the value of the improvements will be capitalized
into higher real estate prices. The housing market translates polit-
ical success into private wealth.
From a social-republican perspective, this is troubling for a
number of reasons. For one thing, there is a concern that the pros-
pect of private gains will divert citizens' attention from the common
good in political decisionmaking. For another, there is a concern
that inequality will be exacerbated. Ellickson, however, focuses on
a partly distinct and in some respects more central concern. To the
extent that the market capitalizes civic improvements in real estate
values, only owners will typically benefit from them in the long run.
In particular, tenants will find that their rents increase by an
amount representing some or all of the market value of their shares
of civic improvements. They may in fact lose their membership in
the community entirely because they can no longer pay the in-




creased rents. At best, they will find themselves paying their land-
lords for improvements that represent the fruits of their own
political participation. On the other hand, since tenants have only
minimal economic investments in their communities, a decline in
the quality of community life affects them differently than owners.
They are more likely to have the option of moving without suffering
great loss.
The important implication is that citizens who lack the long-
term property right associated with ownership may not need to par-
ticipate politically to protect their interests and may not be able to
benefit from such participation. Thus, arguably they lack strong
incentive to participate responsibly or at all. Even on its own nar-
row economic terms the argument requires many qualifications,
6"
but it contains an important measure of truth, as any longstanding
tenant in a neighborhood undergoing gentrification knows.
Ellickson concludes, in effect, that the liberal view of property
rights is in tension with the liberal commitment to universal polit-
ical rights and suggests that the tension might be resolved by disen-
franchising tenants. His argument about the capitalization of
improvements in site values strongly resembles that of the Ameri-
can socialist Henry George, and his argument that nonowners lack
reliable motivation to be civicly responsible strongly resembles that
of the French republican Anne-Marie Robert Turgot.
61
Although there is ample republican precedent for the idea of
restricting franchise to the propertied, there is an alternative repub-
lican response to this tension--extending property to the en-
franchised. Universalizing ownership-type housing interests gives
people security against inflationary economic pressures and chan-
nels economic incentives into the political process by making the
entire class of citizens the "residual claimants" on communal
wealth.6
2
60. See Michelman, Universal Resident Suffrage: A Liberal Defense, 130 U. PA. L.
REv. 1581 (1982).
61. H. GEORGE, PROGRESS AND POVERTY: AN INQUIRY INTO THE CAUSE OF
INDUSTRIAL DEPRESSIONS, AND OF INCREASE OF WANT WITH INCREASE OF WEALTH
THE REMEDY (1879); W. SEWELL, supra note 8, at 129 (quoting Turgot). Actually,
Turgot embraced a solution for which Ellickson expresses admiration but declines to
adopt: allocating voting rights among owners in proportion to the values of their real
estate. Ellickson's proposal to enfrachise nonresident owners, however, departs from
republican precedent, which deems residence a condition of civic participation.
62. Brennan, Rights, Market Failure, and Rent Control: A Comment on Radin, 17
PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 66, 77 (1988).
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The idea that citizens should have a property interest that gives
them a secure and substantial stake in the community plays some
role in mainstream American legal and political culture. Consider,
first, the "homestead" provisions of laws governing the enforcement
of creditors' rights, which connote nineteenth century republican-
ism by both their names and their substance. These laws exempt
from execution by creditors some portion of the value of the
debtor's home. Such laws typically have a built-in transfer and ac-
cumulation restraint in the requirement that the home be used as
the debtor's primary residence to qualify for the exemption. Where
the exemption cannot be waived, it acts as a transfer restraint by
precluding the debtor/homeowner from putting his property at risk
as security for credit. The exemption is sometimes limited to a
maximum amount to prevent it from shielding great wealth.
63
Social-republican notions may also play some role in the ad-
vantages conferred on ownership as opposed to tenancy by the in-
come tax exemptions for interest payments and in-kind housing
income to owner-occupiers. 64 These notions also pertain to prop-
erty tax practices that wholly or partially immunize homeowners
from increases based on appreciation since the time of purchase.
65
Such practices protect citizens from being pushed out of the com-
munity by housing market forces.
Such benefits typically involve some alienation and accumula-
tion restraints, albeit weak ones. The property tax regimes contain
an implicit alienation restraint; the incumbent owner cannot trans-
fer her advantageous assessment and a sale triggers reassessment at
the market value. To the extent tax advantages are conditioned on
owner occupancy, they involve a weak accumulation restraint.
Although they are often available for multiple homes, tax breaks
63. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 704.710-704.995 (West Supp. 1991),
which creates an automatic homestead exemption up to $50,000 that can be extended to
the full value by recording a declaration. Homestead interests can generally be waived
only to secure purchase money debts. See 11 U.S.C.A. § 522(f) (West 1979).
The homeowner-mortgagor's typically nonwaivable "equity of redemption," which
gives him the opportunity after default to redeem his home until late in the foreclosure
process, plays an analogous role. See, e.g., G. NELSON & D. WHITMAN, REAL ESTATE
FINANCE LAW §§ 1.1-1.4 (2d ed. 1985).
For a discussion of several of the residence-related property interests mentioned
here from a related perspective, see Singer, The Reliance Interest in Property, 40 STAN.
L. REV. 611 (1988).
64. See Goode, Imputed Rent of Owner-Occupied Dwellings Under the Income Tax,
15 J. FIN. 504, 518-19 (1960).
65. E.g., CAL. CONST. art. XIIIA, § 2 (codifying "Proposition 13"); see also Alle-
gheny Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. County Comm'n, 488 U.S. 336, 344 n.4 (1989) (reserving
the question of the constitutionality of such provisions).
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often are not available for investment property. (Property tax defer-
ral procedures that, instead of lowering taxes, postpone payment
until the sale of the home or the death of the owner have stronger
accumulation constraints, both because they recapture the tax sub-
sidy and because they are typically conditioned on a showing of
economic hardship or some status, typically old age, associated with
economic hardship.")
The two types of property interests in residence that best ap-
proximate the social-republican ideal occupy a more marginal place
than the tax subsidies. They are, first, tenant interests under rent
control regimes, and second, "limited equity" ownership interests,
especially those organized as housing cooperatives. Very few
American jurisdictions have rent control, and only a tiny fraction of
owner-occupied housing is subject to equity limitations, but both
rent control and limited equity ownership have grown in recent
years, and there has been increasing interest in both as possible re-
sponses to the low-income housing crisis of the past two decades.
Outside the United States there are countries in which large sectors
of the housing stock have been subject to such regimes. 67 A third
type of property interest that is not usually explicitly linked to resi-
dence but often is in fact-interests in voluntary associations such
as social clubs-also sometimes manifests social-republican quali-
ties that can usefully be considered in this context.
A. Rent Control
Since the republican tradition has often equated the ownership
necessary for political autonomy with freehold interests, rent-con-
trolled tenancies may seem a poor approximation. However, rent
control potentially gives tenants property interests that are nearly as
adequate as the freehold for the purposes of security and political
motivation, and it contains built-in alienation and accumulation
retraints.
66. E.g., CAL. REV. & TAx. CODE §§ 20503-20505, 20581-20586 (West 1983 &
Supp. 1990).
67. For example, in Sweden rents are typically controlled, and the "cooperative
sector" has produced a substantial portion of the postwar Swedish housing stock,
though the social-republican features of this sector have been diluted by recent reforms.
J. GILDERBLOOM & R. APPELBAUM, RETHINKING RENTAL HOUSING 163-80 (1988).




Typically, rent control statutes give the tenant security of ten-
ure at a controlled rent.68 The tenant cannot be evicted except for
"cause," which of course includes nonpayment of the lawful rent.
The rent usually is fixed in terms of a base rent negotiated in the
past, which is then adjusted periodically to reflect increases in the
landlord's costs. The regime is designed (with varying degrees of
exactness) to allow the landlord to recover his costs, including a
"fair" return on his capital, while excluding producer surplus and
returns on the scarcity value of the site (or more generally, "rents"
in the technical economic sense, "speculative" return in social-re-
publican rhetoric). Thus, the regime provides some of the same se-
curity as ownership against dispossession due either to landlord
whim or real estate appreciation.
Still, the security of the rent-controlled tenancy is in some re-
spects weaker and in some respects stronger than the social-republi-
can ideal. It is weaker because tenants can be evicted for disturbing
or injurious conduct that owners might get away with and for rea-
sons that have no analogy in the ownership situation-for example,
when the landlord wants to recover the premises for her own use or
that of a relative. It is stronger because the tenant is protected
against losses in market value that the paradigmatic social-republi-
can owner would have to bear.
However, in other respects, the rent-controlled tenancy satis-
fies social-republican norms better than ownership. It is subject to
strong explicit alienation and accumulation restraints. The require-
ment that the benefited tenant be a resident (and sometimes that the
premises be her primary residence) functions as both types of re-
straint, precluding both accumulation of protected occupancy rights
and transfer to nonresidents. Moreover, a common restriction spe-
cifically precludes the tenant from transferring any of her rights for
value, even to successor residents. (Landlords in rent-controlled ju-
risdictions sometimes permit departing tenants to select their
replacements, but it is unlawful for the departing tenant to accept
remuneration from the person she designates.) This means that the
tenant cannot capitalize her rights as the "residual claimant" of the
housing. She can enjoy, without cost, increases in the value of the
premises due, for example, to improvements in the community, but
she can enjoy them only in kind and must remain in place to do so.
These property rights thus give her a positive inducement to work
68. See generally Baar, Guidelines for Drafting Rent Control Laws: Lessons of a
Decade, 35 RUTGERS L. REV. 723 (1983).
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for the improvement of the community through political means and
impose costs on withdrawal from the community.
69
The social-republican view can be contrasted with an argument
for rent control made by Margaret Radin based on the idea of prop-
erty in housing as an expression of "personhood. '' 70 Radin empha-
sizes that people impress their personalities on their homes and view
their homes as extensions of their selves. They experience dispos-
session as a diminution of or an assault on their persons. In her
view, the value of rent control is to protect against such damage.
This argument may mistake damage from loss of economic status
and welfare for damage from loss of a particular home. People do
need space in which to express themselves, but given adequate re-
sources, can often quickly recreate a comfortable environment in a
new home.
By contrast, the social-republican argument sees rent control
as protecting against loss of membership in the community.71 It
may be harder to assimilate into a new community than to recreate
a comfortable home environment, and loss of membership in a com-
munity seems a more serious threat to identity than loss of a partic-
ular dwelling. Moreover, the social-republican argument explains
rent control as a response, not just to individual loss, but to the
collective action problems that arise because the creation and main-
tenance of community requires complex coordination among all the
members.
B. Limited Equity Ownership
Another form of social-republican property in housing is lim-
ited equity ownership. Reformers have occasionally proposed that
freehold owners voluntarily adopt equity limitations by conveying a
portion of their equity to land or home trusts or that governments
69. Rent control is often accused of reducing housing supply by precluding price
increases that would induce new investment. There is good reason to think that this
effect may be quite small in many markets where tenants are most threatened by hous-
ing price inflation. See Note, Reassessing Rent Control: Its Economic Impact in a Gen-
trifying Housing Market, 101 HARV. L. REv. 1835 (1988). The ideal rent control
program transfers the surplus above costs (including "reasonable" return on invest-
ment) of low-cost landlords to tenants, without reducing maintenance incentives or pre-
cluding efficient high-cost landlords from recovering their costs. It operates on the
same principle as Henry George's social-republican land tax. See H. GEORGE, supra
note 61.
70. Radin, Residential Rent Control, 15 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 350 (1986).
71. Radin considers connection to a local community an element of the "per-
sonhood" she would protect, id. at 368-71, so it may be that the difference between her
view and the social-republican view is simply a matter of emphasis.
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regulate the resale of homes to impose equity limitations. However,
the most common source of equity limitations is through conditions
on grants or loans by governments or nonprofit institutions or on
permits or tax dispensations by governments.
Various government and nonprofit agencies operate programs
that subsidize the construction, rehabilitation, or purchase of a
dwelling and then confer limited equity ownership on the occupant.
This approach has been tried, for instance, in connection with pro-
grams that rehabilitate dilapidated properties acquired by munici-
palities through condemnation under health and safety codes or
through enforcement of tax liens. And limited equity interests are
sometimes a component of "linkage" or "set aside" programs at-
tached to the process of land use regulation; for example, regulatory
permissions for a large commercial housing project may be condi-
tioned on the developer's allocating a fraction of the dwellings to
low-income residents.
Limited equity ownership interests are defined by at least one
or the other of-and typically both-a transfer restraint and an ac-
cumulation restraint.72 If the dwelling is part of a cooperative asso-
ciation, the restraints will be enforceable by the cooperative.
Whether or not a cooperative is involved, ultimate enforcement au-
thority usually will be lodged in some governmental or nonprofit
entity, perhaps the one funding the subsidy, or perhaps a land bank
or community development corporation created for this purpose.
The transfer constraint, in addition to conditioning ownership
on continued occupancy as a primary residence, will give the coop-
erative or enforcement agency control over the transfer of the eq-
uity interest. The constraint may require resale to the cooperative
or agency (which can then decide on its own whom to retransfer it
to), give the cooperative a right of first refusal, require its consent to
sale, or require that the buyer satisfy stipulated conditions, espe-
cially with regard to income.
The prindipal accumulation restraint concerns the resale price.
One sort of restraint merely requires sharing of gains with the subsi-
dizer or enforcement authority. For example, one New York pro-
gram permits the owner to sell to anyone at any price so long as he
72. See generally Massachusetts Government Land Bank, Building for the Com-
monwealth: Materials on Limited Equity Housing Cooperatives (1987); D. KIRKPAT-
RICK, LEGAL ISSUES IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF HOUSING COOPERATIVES (National
Economic Development and Law Center 1981).
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pays forty percent of any capital gain to the city. 73 The more exact-
ing restraints limit the sale price to the amounts of the purchase
price, plus any capital improvements paid for by the owner, plus
interest on amounts invested by the owner. A variety of intermedi-
ate standards have been used or proposed.
74
The more restrictive standards seem most consistent with so-
cial-republican principles. They provide security of tenure and en-
able the owner to recover his investment when he needs to leave,
but deny him the opportunity to capitalize his surplus in the home
or in the scarcity value of the site. Critics have argued for more
generous standards on the ground that the departing owner may
need more money to purchase on the market in the area to which he
moves.75 This seems unpersuasive. A market-level sales price may
remove the home from the low-income housing stock (or require
the diversion of subsidies that would have been available for other
units to keep it there). It also enables the departing owner to take
some of the subsidy out of the community. Moreover, it is a very
overbroad way of dealing with the hypothesized problem, since the
departing owner will not necessarily have a low income When he
leaves and may not encounter high housing prices in the area to
which he moves.
76
73. Roberts, Owning a Co-op: Bid for Stability by Black Tenants, N.Y. Times, July
6, 1987, § 1, at 33, col. 1.
74. Although state real property law can usually accomodate such limited equity
interests, it often can do so only cumbersomely and without certain enforceability.
Alienation and accumulation restraints expressed in deed restrictions may be vulnerable
to challenge under rules against restraints on alienation, the rule against perpetuities,
and usury laws. (The usury issue arises when an agency finances with a loan and
reserves a share of appreciation on resale; if the appreciation were considered interest,
the loan would often be usurious.) Having the agency retain title to the land and ex-
pressing restraints on the structure in a ground lease for the land is thought to be a more
reliable approach in many jurisdictions. The unfamiliarity of limited equity arrange-
ments to lenders (and their lack of negotiability in secondary markets) increases the
difficulty of securing conventional financing. Buccino, The Enforceability of Resale
Controls: A Study of San Francisco's First-Time Homebuyer Program (unpublished pa-
per); D. KIRKPATRICK, supra note 72, at 91-95.
75. See D. KIRKPATRICK, supra note 72, at 77, 82 (describing the argument re-
ferred to in the text).
76. Reliable enforcement of equity limitations probably requires that the owner be
obliged to resell to a public or nonprofit entity at a controlled price. Alternatively, they
should at least prescribe both income limitations on purchasers and price controls.
Several limited equity programs in American municipalities appear to have quite
weak equity limitations. This may be due to the administrators' lack of sympathy for
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A further objection to strict price restraints is their inconsis-
tency with the idea of "ownership."' 77 This is true if the reference is
to the classical liberal conception of ownership, but it seems doubt-
ful that the subsidy program itself is justifiable in classical liberal
terms. The restraints seem quite consistent with social-republican
ownership notions. There, home ownership means a secure physi-
cal place in the community, not control of a commodity whose
value is defined in an impersonal market.
Limited equity housing interests are often created as coopera-
tives. From a social-republican point of view, cooperatives have the
virtue of creating a community within a community. Cooperatives
usually take the form of a single multiunit building, but "scattered
site" cooperatives sometimes unite dwellings in distinct buildings.
In a cooperative, ownership is held in common by a corporate
entity of which the residents are members. In cooperatives inspired
by social-republican ideals, voting rights are allocated to adult resi-
dents either on a one person-one vote--or more commonly, one
household-one vote-basis. (By contrast, in other cooperatives, and
typically in homeowners' associations, voting is allocated in propor-
tion to the purchase price or market value of each dwelling.
78)
Each household has membership and voting rights in the common
corporate owner and a lease or occupancy agreement that gives it
relatively exclusive possession and tenure of its dwelling.
The cooperative form adds two important features to limited
equity housing. First, it creates an egalitarian mechanism for par-
ticipation in the management of common facilities (or in the case of
scattered site cooperatives, for the joint management of separate fa-
cilities). Second, it provides for the cross-collateralization of mem-
bers' mortgage obligations. Since members own shares in the
cooperative rather than their individual dwellings, and since the co-
operative as a whole is the obligor on the mortgage debt, members
share responsibility for defaults of their peers. This arrangement
thus creates a fairly strong form of interdependence, as well as op-
portunities for collective action.
social-republican property notions, and perhaps to a tendency to view housing subsidies
as a short-term patronage resource.
Resale controls were abolished in 1969 on a substantial segment of the Swedish
cooperative housing stock, and there has been extensive debate over their desirability
since then. J. GILDERBLOOM & R. APPELBAUM, supra note 67, at 175-77.
77. See D. KIRKPATRICK, supra note 72, at 82 (describing the argument referred to
in the text).
78. Ellickson, supra note 59, at 1543.
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We can get a further sense of the distinctive affinity of limited
equity housing with social-republican ideals by contrasting it to two
more common forms of subsidized housing: public or nonprofit-
owned rental housing and vouchers. Public rental housing is com-
parable to rent-controlled private housing in giving the tenant se-
curity of tenure that amounts to a long-term, noncapitalizable stake
in the dwelling. However, despite examples of tenant management
and advisory counsels, public housing rarely gives tenants opportu-
nities to participate in managing their housing comparable to those
associated with ownership. This failing is a function of the further
fact that public rental housing does not provide the inducement to
participate that comes from the limited equity owner's equity stake
and, in cooperatives, collective responsibility for the mortgage.
Voucher programs subsidize tenants who rent housing on the
private market by providing for payment by the subsidizing agency
of a fraction of the rent. The largest of such programs-the "sec-
tion 8" program of the Housing and Community Development Act
of 1974-sets the subsidy so that the tenant need pay no more than
thirty percent of her income in rent.79 It thus secures the tenant
against dispossession because of insufficient income but provides
only limited and ambiguous protection against dispossession for
other reasons.80 This otherwise typical rental relationship gives the
tenant no responsibility or control over maintenance and improve-
ments to the premises.
The most fundamental difference between the voucher and
most other forms of subsidized, low-income housing is that the
voucher subsidy is not attached to any particular dwelling. The
transfer restraint on the subsidy is thus weaker: while the benefici-
ary cannot exchange the subsidy for cash or some good other than
housing and cannot give it to another tenant, she can take it to any
other dwelling in the jurisdiction that an owner is willing to rent to
her. In theory, this should give her market power that mitigates
dependence on the landlord and induces the landlord to maintain
the premises in a fashion satisfactory to her.81 However, even when
vouchers work as intended, they seem less satisfactory than limited
equity ownership from a social-republican perspective. As a rental
79. 42 U.S.C. § 1437(f) (1988).
80. 24 C.F.R. § 882.215 (1990).
81. Legal aid housing lawyers tell me that, in practice, § 8 beneficiaries in some
areas often find it difficult to find apartments at suitable rents, and are thus vulnerable
to exploitation by the few landlords who will rent to them. The difficulty appears to
reflect the inadequacy of the subsidies, landlord discrimination, or both.
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arrangement, the subsidy does not give the beneficiary the sense of
control and responsibility associated with ownership. And unlike
cooperative ownership, it does not create a community of interde-
pendent, jointly responsible members.
C. Local Voluntary Associations
During the nineteenth century and even recently, observers
have often suggested that the comparative underdevelopment of the
American state has been balanced by the extensive development of
voluntary associations. "Americans of all ages, stations in life, and
all types of disposition are forever forming associations," Alexis de
Tocqueville wrote.82 The associations that are most interesting in
the present context are often called mutual benefit organizations.
They include consumer cooperatives, sports and social clubs, ama-
teur learned societies, and churches. They should be distinguished
on the one hand from mutual or cooperative enterprises, considered
below, and on the other from nonprofit charitable organizations.
Unlike cooperative enterprises, mutual benefit societies serve their
members primarily as consumers rather than as workers, and they
typically do not produce for outsiders. Unlike nonprofit charitable
organizations, they are designed to benefit their members rather
than the public at large or some larger, more indefinite group, and
they are controlled by their members, while charitable organiza-
tions are typically organized in ways that preclude beneficiary
control.
Mutual benefit voluntary associations often have a social-re-
publican cast. The common law of voluntary associations and the
more recent mutual benefit corporation statutes take a largely
facilitative posture: members can define their relations more or less
as they like. However, the default provisions of the common law
and often the statutes express distinctly social-republican expecta-
tions. Presumptively, membership rights are nontransferable and
governance is on a one person-one vote basis.
83
The preclusion of individual appropriation or capitalization of
membership rights is emphasized: "By becoming a member of an
association, a person ordinarily acquires, not a severable right to
82. A. DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 485 (J. Mayer & M. Lerner
eds. 1966).
83. 7 CJ.S. Associations §§ 19, 20, 26, 27 (1990).
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any of its property or funds, but merely a right to the joint use and
enjoyment thereof as long as he continues to be a member."
84
While the law recognizes no individual right in association
property, it does recognize a distinctive individual right in member-
ship. Generally, members of voluntary associations cannot be ex-
pelled except for valid reasons and in accordance with fair
procedures. The right protects, not a liquid property interest, but
rather the "member's relation to the association," and for this rea-
son it is often specifically enforceable.85
Nevertheless, there is one respect in which the traditional law
of voluntary associations seems ill-suited to social-republican pur-
poses-it does not effectively constrain the private appropriation of
associational capital. Although the default rules often preclude dis-
tributions to members during the life of the association, they typi-
cally permit the members to dissolve the association by majority
vote and distribute the association's property among themselves.
8 6
(Former members have no claim on the property no matter how
much they may have contributed to it.) Noting the apparent incon-
sistency between the prohibition of ongoing distributions to mem-
bers and the tolerance of liquidating ones, Henry Hansmann
proposes that the prohibition be abandoned.8 7 However, a social-
republican might prefer to extend the prohibition to liquidation. A
social-republican regime for mutual benefit associations might
adopt the common practice with respect to charitable corporations
of providing that on dissolution the association's property be trans-
ferred to a comparable organization serving similar purposes.
Though the law does not apply such constraints to mutual ben-
efit associations by default and even maintains obstacles to creating
them expressly,88 it appears that members often treat the capital of
mutual benefit associations as if it were subject to such constraints
and forego opportunities for individual appropriation in order to
retain the social-republican character of the enterprise. Social,
84. Id. § 26; see Lawson v. Hewell, 118 Cal. 613, 50 P. 763 (1897); De Bruyn v.
Golden Age Club, 399 P.2d 390 (Wyo. 1965).
85. Chafee, The Internal Affairs of Associations Not for Profit, 43 HARV. L. REV.
993, 1007 (1930).
86. 7 C.J.S. Associations §§ 56, 59 (1990); Hansmann, Reforming Nonprofit Corpo-
ration Law, 129 U. PA. L. REV. 497, 575-78 (1981).
87. Hansmann, supra note 86, at 587-95.
88. The traditional doctrine holds that a nondestructible, noncharitable trust for an
unincorporated association that extends beyond the period of the rule against perpetu-
ities is invalid unless "the unqualified power to expend the corpus thereof for one or
more purposes of the association is given to the trustee, or to the members of the associ-
ation, or to some other person or persons." RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 380 (1944).
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country, and athletic clubs organized as mutual associations often
accumulate property, especially through real estate appreciation.
Sometimes the members respond by permitting the creation of a
limited market in membership or by terminating and selling to a
commercial operator, but often they do not. Instead, the members
retain collective control over the admission of new members and
admit them on terms that disregard capital accumulation and ap-
preciation. The participants simply do not commodify their mem-
berships; they think of them as relations rather than as financial
investments. 89
Another form of mutual benefit organization is the consumer
cooperative of the sort occasionally found in the retail grocery busi-
ness and more commonly in retail book sales at universities. Mu-
tual savings banks and insurance companies are also forms of
consumer cooperatives. Although consumer cooperatives and mu-
tual benefit enterprises are typically organized under legal regimes
distinct from voluntary associations, they bear a strong kinship to
voluntary associations. They also typically manifest similar aliena-
tion and accumulation restraints. In particular, consumer coopera-
tives with substantial capital tend to preclude members from
capitalizing their interests by limiting the amounts for which mem-
bers' shares can be redeemed. There is a corresponding tendency to
admit new members on terms that disregard the value of the organi-
zation's capital.9
IV. INTERESTS ASSOCIATED WITH WORK
The American economy has generated a variety of enterprises
designed along social-republican lines. Such enterprises have often
been termed "cooperatives," though the term is both over- and
under-inclusive. It is over-inclusive because many nominal cooper-
atives lack the strong alienation and accumulation restraints en-
89. I am unaware of any published documentation of this point, but it is supported
by anecdotes from acquaintances about various social clubs.
90. R. HEFLEBOWER, COOPERATIVES AND MUTUALS IN THE MARKET SYSTEM
183-85 (1980).
Homeowners' associations are another species of association that might be viewed
as social-republican. See Ellickson, supra note 59, at 1521-39. They are typically con-
stituted with alienation restraints (deed restrictions) that require purchasers to adhere
to association rules. Owners have voting rights in the association, and even when voting
rights are allocated by investment rather than on a one per person (or unit) basis, dis-
parities in voting power are often limited by the limited range of property values. How-
ever, the associations typically do not themselves own property (except in some cases,
common areas), and typically there are no equity limitations on individual holdings.
Members can cash out most or all of their interest on departure.
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tailed by the social-republican vision. It is under-inclusive because
some variations of enterprises with other designations-mutual
companies, partnerships, and corporations with employee stock
ownership plans-do have such characteristics.
Cooperative enterprise in the social-republican sense was at the
core of some of the more important nineteenth century radical
movements, including those associated with the Farmers' Alliance
and the Knights of Labor. 91 Such radical programs failed politi-
cally, but the social-republican vision has always had some power.
A variety of modem laws and programs give symbolic and (usually
small) material support for cooperatives. The Capper-Volstead Act
exempts cooperatives from many strictures of the antitrust laws.
92
Subchapter T of the Internal Revenue Code gives preferential tax
treatment to cooperatives. 93 Congress has created a network of
"Banks for Cooperatives" to afford credit to agricultural and rural
utility cooperatives. 94 And it has created tax subsidies for Em-
ployee Stock Ownership Plans, a few of which have social-republi-
can cooperative features.95
Myriad experiments in cooperative enterprise have failed, and
few have achieved long-term success, but there are some examples
of successful, stable cooperative enterprises. Indeed, there are a few
sectors of the American economy in which enterprises designed on
cooperative principles have gained footholds over broad segments of
an industry for long periods of time. In agriculture, mutual or co-
operative enterprises that provide power and water, that market
crops, and that purchase supplies and equipment continue to flour-
ish, though they depart in many ways from social-republican princi-
ples. In professional services, especially legal services, partnerships
conforming to a substantial measure to the social-republican model
have been prominent. In the manufacturing sector long-term suc-
cess stories are rarer, but there are some. Perhaps the best known is
a group of plywood production companies in the Pacific Northwest
that have operated successfully as cooperatives since the late
1940).96
91. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
92. 7 U.S.C. §§ 291-292 (1988).
93. I.R.C. §§ 1381-1388 (1988); see also the additional provisions offering
favorable treatment for agricultural cooperatives at I.R.C. § 521.
94. 12 U.S.C. §§ 2121-2149a (1988).
95. I.R.C. §§ 401(a), 409(e), 4975(e)(7) (1988).
96. See generally J. KNAPP, THE RISE OF AMERICAN COOPERATIVE ENTERPRISE
(1969); R. RUSSELL, SHARING OWNERSHIP IN THE WORKPLACE (1985); WORKER CO-
OPERATIVES IN AMERICA (R. Jackall & H. Levin eds. 1984); Gilson & Mnookin, Shar-
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There are two well-known foreign models of cooperative enter-
prise, both of which date from the early 1950s. One is the Yugoslav
self-management model, which was applied throughout most of the
manufacturing sector of the Yugoslav economy with mixed suc-
cess.97 The other is the model of the Mondragon cooperatives in
the Basque region of Spain, a network of cooperative enterprises
with about 20,000 members that has enjoyed remarkable growth
and profitability over four decades.98 The Mondragon model has
inspired a variety of reform and promotion efforts, such as those of
the Industrial Cooperative Association of Somerville, Massachu-
setts, and is reflected in recent state legislation designed to facilitate
cooperatives. 99
These various enterprise models have in common that they
limit important ownership rights to people who have an independ-
ent participatory role in the organization other than as capital sup-
pliers. In partnerships of this kind, these people are the partners.
In cooperatives, they are typically referred to as "members" in their
managerial capacity and "patrons" in their capacity as residual
claimants on the organization's earningsboo In ESOPs, they are
shareholders. The independent role may be as workers producing
products within the cooperative enterprise, or as independent pro-
ducers using supplies purchased by the enterprise or producing
products marketed by it.
Most of these arrangements contemplate that the residual re-
turns go to patrons, often in proportion to "patronage." This
means that finance, whether internal or external, must take the
form of fixed debt-like, rather than equity-like, claims.
The rest of this Part considers, from a social-republican point
of view, partnerships, production cooperatives, and ESOPs. It then
considers whether certain kinds of employment security might man-
ing Among the Human Capitalists: An Economic Inquiry into the Corporate Law Firm
and How Partners Split Profits, 37 STAN. L. REV. 313 (1985); Hansmann, When Does
Worker Ownership Work? ESOPs, Law Firms, Codetermination, and Economic Democ-
racy, 99 YALE L.J. 1749 (1990).
97. See H. LYDALL, supra note 5.
98. W. WHYTE & K. WHYTE, MAKING MONDRAGON: THE GROWTH AND DY-
NAMICS OF THE WORKER COOPERATIVE COMPLEX (1988); David Ellerman, The Mon-
dragon Cooperative Experiment (Harvard Business School n.d.).
99. See Ellerman & Pitegoff, The Democratic Corporation: The New Worker Coop-
erative Statute in Massachusetts, 11 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 441 (1983).
100. The use of the term "patron" in the cooperative context seems to derive from
the consumer cooperative model, perhaps that of the Rochedale Pioneers in Britain,
which had a great influence on 19th century American producer cooperative efforts.
See J. KNAPP, supra note 96, at 30-31, 51-57.
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ifest social-republican characteristics. Finally, it considers certain
characteristics of institutions of interfirm coordination, such as
trade associations, labor unions, and purchasing and supply
cooperatives.
A. Partnerships
The widely enacted Uniform Partnership Act contains in its
default provisions a vision of enterprise organization with strong
social-republican features. Partners are presumed to share power
and distribute profits equally. 10' Moreover, the right to participate
in the enterprise (though not the right to receive profits) is non-
transferable.' 0 2 And the transfer of control to nonworkers is inhib-
ited by the doctrines of inadvertent partnership and unlimited
liability that often impose unlimited risks of enterprise loss on pas-
sive investors.'03 While many of the transfer and control features
prescribed by the Act can be varied by contrary agreement, a few
cannot, including the inadvertent partnership principle, the rule
that any partner can bind the enterprise in ordinary business vis-a-
vis third parties, and the option of any partner to dissolve the part-
nership at will (subject to damages for wrongfully doing so).'0
4
In the professions, the social-republican aspects of the partner-
ship model have been complemented or reinforced by professional
concerns. The control of work by absentee investors has been inhib-
ited by professional norms limiting the extent to which profession-
als can practice under the control of nonprofessionals and imposing
strong nonwaivable duties to clients on individual practitioners.'
05
Moreover, the ideal of practice among elite professionals has
often involved a substantial measure of solidaristic egalitarianism.
For example, many elite corporate law firms have tended to be or-
ganized in relatively egalitarian ways, at least compared to compa-
rable business organizations. Though there have been radical
distinctions of compensation and power in these organizations be-
tween partners and nonpartners and professional and nonprofes-
sional staff, such distinctions have been relaxed among partners.
Partners traditionally have had security of membership in the part-
101. UNIF. PARTNERSHIP AcT § 18 (1969).
102. Id. §§ 25, 27.
103. Eg., Martin v. Peyten, 246 N.Y. 213, 158 N.E. 77 (1927).
104. UNIF. PARTNERSHIP ACT §§ 9, 31 (1969).
105. Eg, MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 5-107(C) (lawyer
not to practice in for-profit organization if nonlawyers are investors, directors, officers,




nership and a voice in management, though voting has often de-
parted from one person-one vote in order to favor seniority or
productivity. In some firms, compensation among partners has
taken the form of a "lock step seniority system" in which every
partner in each cohort receives the same amount without regard to
estimates of productivity. 106
Moreover, the social-republican character of the professional
firm is encouraged by professional norms designed to inhibit the
commodification of client relations and the capitalization of returns
to professional expertise. Like republicanism and market social-
ism-in part, through them-legal professionalism has been influ-
enced by the labor theory of value. A traditional premise of legal
professionalism has been that lawyers are paid for performing legal
work for clients. This principle has in turn inhibited the charging of
referral fees for simply putting the client in touch with another law-
yer who then performs the work. 10 7 The restriction on referral fees
can be seen as an objection to commodifying the client-treating his
trust in the referring lawyer as an asset on which that lawyer might
earn a return. The same premise is implied by the prohibition on
the "sale" of a professional practice, which, of course, would
amount basically to the sale of clients.10 8
Social-republican and legal professional concerns also converge
in the disfavoring of noncompetition covenants.1 9 Such rules may
have some relation to the "free labor" notion that a person's pro-
ductive capacities are an inalienable component of her identity as a
citizen-producer. In the professional context, the nonenforceability
of such covenants further inhibits the commodification and capitali-
zation of client relations. Since lawyers cannot make an enforceable
promise not to take clients back, it is harder for them to demand
compensation for transferring clients.
Perhaps because of such norms (and no doubt because of prac-
tical constraints), elite professional practice has often manifested a
central hallmark of social-republican property-an economic inter-
est contingent on active membership in the enterprise that cannot
be capitalized fully or carried away on departure. The provisions
governing compensation of departing partners in elite law firms
106. See Gilson & Mnookin, supra note 96.
107. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 2-22, DR 2-107 (1982).
108. Dwyer v. Jung, 133 N.J. Super. 343, 346, 336 A.2d 498, 499, aff'd, 137 N.J.
Super. 135, 348 A.2d 208 (1975); ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics and Grievances,
Formal Op. 266 (1945); H. DRINKER, LEGAL ETHICS 189 (1953).
109. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-108 (1982).
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have traditionally contemplated payment mainly of principal and
interest on capital contributions, retained profits allocable to the
partner, and receipts allocable to services performed by the partner.
The opportunities for future earnings that are typically reified and
capitalized as "goodwill" in the conventional capitalist enterprise
have not been a core element of the conception of property rights in
the professional firm. 110
These professional principles have been violated as frequently
as they have been espoused-firms have always varied widely in the
extent to which they have approached social-republican organiza-
tional models, and the recent trend is toward both dilution of the
professional norms and rejection of the social-republican models in
favor of more conventionally capitalistic ones. Yet the prior history
of firms organized on this model can be counted as a major instance
of social-republican success. The principles still appeal to a constit-
uency within the professional elite and some of the most successful
law firms continue to adhere to them. 1
B. Production Cooperatives
Statutes dealing with cooperatives typically reflect a fairly
loose conception of such organizations, but most require, or at least
imply, distinctive procedures concerning at least either control or
the distribution of residual returns. The Capper-Volstead Act ex-
emption for agricultural cooperatives requires that an organization
either allocate voting control on a one-per-member basis or that it
allocate residual returns on the basis of patronage (work performed
or goods sold through or bought from the cooperative) rather than
financial investment. 112 The Internal Revenue Code exemption for
cooperative income applies only to "patronage dividends" and not
to residual returns on capital contributions. 113 Capper-Volstead re-
quires that the enterprise be operated "for the mutual benefit of the
110. See P. CARRINGTON & W. SUTHERLAND, ARTICLES OF PARTNERSHIP FOR
LAW FIRMS (ABA 1961) (model provisions with a discussion of prevailing practices);
see also Siddall v. Keating, 8 A.D.2d 44, 47, 185 N.Y.S.2d 630, 632-33, aff'd, 7 N.Y.2d
846, 164 N.E.2d 860, 196 N.Y.S.2d 986 (1959) ("good will is not ordinarily attributable
to a law partnership"; to attribute it to a partnership would violate referral fee
prohibition).
11. See Gilson & Mnookin, supra note 96; Simon, Babbitt v. Brandeis: The Decline
of the Professional Ideal, 37 STAN. L. REV. 565 (1985).
112. 7 U.S.C. § 291 (1988).
113. I.R.C. § 1382(b)(1) (1988). A separate rule for agricultural cooperatives ex-
empts dividends on capital stock if they do not exceed eight percent and all the stock is
owned by the patrons. I.R.C. § 521 (1988).
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members," and Subchapter T requires that it be operated "on a co-
operative basis"; both standards limit the use of outside equity. 
1 4
State cooperative corporation statutes are typically enabling
legislation designed to make clear that the corporate form is avail-
able to organizations that separate voting rights from capital contri-
butions and distribute net returns to patrons. They rarely strongly
require such features as a condition of organizing under the statute,
though they sometimes prescribe them in the absence of a decision
by the corporation to opt for a different arrangement.
1 5
Although the mandatory statutory conditions are weak, nearly
all producer cooperative shares are subject to transfer restraints,
since the shares confer worker-member status. The restraints may
mandate resale to the enterprise (which can then make its own deci-
sions about ' whom to admit), or give the enterprise options, rights of
refusal, or rights of approval with respect to the transfer of rights by
departing members. Such provisions, however, are not radically
different from those commonly found in conventional small busi-
ness arrangements.
The nature and extent of accumulation constraints varies more
widely. Some cooperatives (or, more generally, producer-owned en-
terprises) defy social-republican norms by allocating voting or con-
trol rights on a basis other than one person-one vote. The
departures that are most easily reconciled with social-republican
principles allocate voting on the basis of "patronage" (in a worker
114. The extent of the limit is unclear. See Rev. Rul. 82-51, 1982-1 C.B. 117. Cap-
per-Volstead requires that agricultural cooperatives which do not limit voting power to
one vote per member may not pay dividends on stock in excess of eight percent, but
provides no explicit limit for cooperatives with egalitarian voting rules. 7 U.S.C. § 291
(1988).
The principle that dividends on capital stock be "limited" (i.e., capped at moderate
rates) appears in the rules of the Rochdale Cooperative Society that influenced 19th
century British and American cooperatives and the rules of the International Coopera-
tive Alliance that influence contemporary European ones. J. BONIN & L. PUTTERMAN,
ECONOMICS OF COOPERATION AND THE LABOR-MANAGED ECONOMY 145-47 (1987);
J. KNAPP, supra note 96, at 34.
115. E.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 12410 (West Supp. 1991) (cooperative membership
shares nontransferable in absence of bylaw to the contrary); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch.
157A, §§ 6, 7 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1991) (members must have equal voting rights; voting
rights to nonmembers requires member authorization).
Some American cooperatives are organized under general incorporation acts.
Modern corporation statutes are generally flexible enough to accomodate worker coop-
eratives. Many state cooperative statutes have not been recently revised and were
designed with. consumer or marketing, rather than producer, cooperatives in mind.
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cooperative, the amount of work performed). Those least reconcila-
ble allocate rights in proportion to capital contributions.
1 1 6
Perhaps the most revealing accumulation issue concerns the
economic rights of members on departure. Here we can distinguish
three general approaches, only the last of which seems fully consis-
tent with social-republican principle. The least consistent approach
is what might be called the unlimited equity cooperative. Here
there are no limitations on the amount for which a departing mem-
ber may sell (to a permissible buyer). The member sells her interest
for its market value. This is true of most older contemporary
American cooperatives.' 
17
Where the departing member can sell for market value, one
might say that her interest in the firm is not social-republican prop-
erty, since it represents an interest in the future earnings of the firm
that can be realized without remaining a member. Moreover, if the
cooperative has been successful, then the need of the new entrant to
make a large payment will introduce inequality between the old and
new members, and if the cooperative finances the purchase with a
loan to the new member, this inequality will be reflected in lower
current net payments to that member.
Nevertheless, two factors mitigate the tendency of unlimited
equity provisions to dissolve social-republican property. First, most
cooperatives are small businesses and, because of the high relative
costs of disseminating and acquiring reliable information about
such businesses, the market value of ownership interests in small
businesses may reflect a greater discount of future earnings than
that of large businesses. Second, since the memberships can only be
sold to people who are acceptable to the existing workforce as peers
(and who either have the sufficient cash or seem creditworthy), the
pool of buyers will be limited, and this will impose a further dis-
count. The interests reflected by these discounts-interests in fu-
ture earnings that can only be appropriated by remaining with the
enterprise-are kinds of social-republican property, though they are
common features of small business generally, not just those styled
explicitly in social-republican terms.
116. Mutual water companies and public irrigation districts often allocate voting
rights (and assessments) in proportion to acreage or land values.
117. Examples are the plywood companies of the Pacific Northwest, cooperative
taxicab companies in several American cities, and the cooperative garbage companies in
the San Francisco Bay area. K. BERMAN, WORKER-OWNED PLYWOOD COMPANIES
194-96 (1967); R. RUSSELL, supra note 96, at 74-79, 123.
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The second approach to capital appropriation can be called the
no-equity cooperative. It is exemplified by the model of the self-
managed firm espoused by Jaroslav Vanek, based in part on a cri-
tique of the Yugoslav experiments.s18 In this model, the enterprise
must be financed entirely by debt. Not only is outside equity pro-
hibited, but so is inside equity, or self-financing through retained
earnings. The Vanek firm does not accumulate capital; its net
worth is always zero, and workers benefit only through current dis-
tributions. The zero-net-worth norm requires not only that earn-
ings be paid out as earned, but that increases in firm goodwill or
going concern value be immediately cashed out with borrowed
funds. 119
If the unlimited equity cooperative lacks social-republican
property because all its capital is subject to individual appropria-
tion, the no-equity firm lacks social-republican property because it
cannot accumulate capital at all. Vanek's approach is designed to
avoid inefficiencies attributed by neoclassical economists to the la-
bor-managed firm,120 but from a social-republican point of view, it
creates new problems. Labor and product markets are competitive
in the Vanek model. Though the compensation workers receive is
variable, since it depends on enterprise performance, prospectively
workers anticipate no more from association with their firm than
118. Vanek, Some Fundamental Considerations on Financing and the Form of Own.
ership Under Labor Management, in THE LABOR MANAGED ECONOMY 171-85 (1977).
119. The need to cash out capital gains is my own inference from Vanek's premises.
Vanek himself apparently contemplates that the firm will be prevented from acquiring
goodwill or other firm specific capital by (a) entry of competing firms that will eliminate
rents and supra-competitive returns and (b) the requirement that intangible as well as
physical capital be rented (or purchased with borrowed funds) rather than developed
with internal resources. See J. VANEK, THE GENERAL THEORY OF LABOR-MANAGED
MARKET ECONOMIEs 386 (1970); McCain, Empirical Implications of Worker Participa-
tion in Management, in PARTICIPATORY AND SELF-MANAGED FIRMS 40 (J. Svejnar &
D. Jones eds. 1982). But free entry could not eliminate supracompetitive returns as
long as successful firms had confidential information about costs and revenues. And to
the extent that competitive returns include a return to entrepreneurial risk or innova-
tion, successful firms would still experience capital gains. Many intangibles could not
be rented because they are necessarily developed internally (e.g., on-the-job learning) or
because, being firm specific, they cannot serve as adequate collateral for the firm's pay-
ment obligations.
Obviously, the no-equity (or in Vanek's rhetoric, "pure rental") firm creates moral
hazard problems: the lender assumes most of the risk without getting any control, while
the workers have limited incentives to preserve the firm's assets.
Finally, note that in practice the attempt to preclude equity accumulation by con-
stantly cashing out gains would involve probably insuperable valuation difficulties and
transaction costs.
120. See infra note 180 and, more generally, J. BONIN & L. PUTrERMAN, supra
note 114, at 13-18, 56-61..
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the market rate for their services, which presumably they could get
from other firms as well. If the enterprise is successful, workers will
benefit, but they will be able to capitalize the success immediately.
While workers get no additional payment when they leave, they
have no strong economic interest in remaining either.
Thus, the centrifugal pull of market forces is likely to lead to
high turnover that will jeopardize the identity of the enterprise as
an enduring community. Changing market signals will constantly
induce members to leave or require the quick assimilation of outsid-
ers. These pressures may be weaker than the corresponding ones in
the economy envisioned by neoclassical economics, but they will re-
main substantial, and Vanek's model has no strong economic force
countering them. In the social-republican view, an important rea-
son for the creation and persistence of firms, especially firms that
can be plausibly viewed as political communities, is the productivity
of a kind of goodwill capital or going concern value that is necessar-
ily illiquid. But Vanek's requirement that such capital be cashed
out to maintain net worth at zero precludes this critical economic
solvent. From a social-republican point of view, the fact that most
successful firms necessarily acquire capital is a virtue, not, as it ap-
pears in the Vanek analysis, a defect.121
The cooperative form most consistent with social-republican
principle is the limited equity firm. The version with the most se-
vere equity limitations is probably the one prescribed in Yugoslav
market socialism prior to the reforms of 1988. Yugoslavia broadly
prohibited both employment and private ownership of capital.
Where these prohibitions applied, all workers over eighteen were
121. Although I think the no-equity model is incompatible with the most plausible
formulation of social-republican principle, it does bear some affinity to social-republican
rhetoric, and many social-republicans might mistake it for their ideal because they tend
not to think of their enterprises as accumulating capital in many circumstances in which
they do accumulate capital. I think this tendency is due in part to the fact that coopera-
tors are relatively likely to view their interests in relational rather than financial terms.
They may be especially resistant to the idea of "goodwill"-relations of trust and col-
laboration reified as capital.
Ideological cooperators influenced by the labor theory of value seem particularly
likely to be influenced by such attitudes. However, even hard-headed businesspeople
sometimes seem to be influenced by these attitudes in their dealings with cooperatives.
For example, outsiders have noted the casualness and informality of the equity redemp-
tion practices of many mainstream agricultural cooperatives and the implied indiffer-
ence to what, from a conventional capitalist point of view, appears to be substantial
cross-subsidization. FARMER COOPERATIVE SERVICE, U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., EQUITY
REDEMPTION PRACTICES OF AGRICULTURAL COOPERATIVES, FCS RESEARCH RE-
PORT 41 (April 1977). Vagueness about capital rights on departure seems a common
feature of American cooperatives.
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members of the firm, or collective, and were entitled to equal votes
both in the selection of management (directly or through represen-
tative councils) and on a wide range of policy decisions (subject,
however, to a variety of severe extra-enterprise constraints and pres-
sures). The collectives received capital from banks or state agencies
subject to the duty to maintain its value through a depreciation re-
serve, to pay interest on it, and to pay taxes on net earnings. (For
some enterprises, these duties were lightened by the failure of the
system to take account of inflation in setting either depreciation re-
quirements or interest rates, and by lax enforcement of debt obliga-
tions.) The members were the residual claimants on the firm's
earnings. They decided, within significant limits, on the distribu-
tion of the net earnings after taxes among wages, reinvestment, and
collective consumption. (The scope of this discretion varied over
time; it appears to have been widest from 1965 to the early 1970s.)
The workers, of course, could not alienate their rights of member-
ship or capitalize their claims on earnings. They could benefit from
their rights only to the extent they remain active members.
1 22
A version with less severe limitations is the one associated with
the Mondragon network. Mondragon adheres to the one person-
122. See generally, H. LYDALL, supra note 5, at 82-88.
The 1988 reforms retained the notion of industrial capital as social property but
diluted and narrowed its role in the economy. See Ellis, Yugoslavia's Move Toward a
Market Economy: An Analysis of the New Law on Enterprises, 7 B.U. INT'L L.J. 301
(1989).
It seems doubtful that either the comparative success of the Yugoslav economy
through the mid- 1970s or its subsequent failure should be taken as evidence of the via-
bility of social-republican property arrangements. The worker control norms were im-
plemented only marginally. Moreover, the economy adopted a series of economically
dubious practices that were not mandated by social-republican norms, including the
rationing of capital at negative interest rates, the failure to enforce debt obligations, the
maintenance of preclusive barriers to competitive entry, undisciplined monetary policy,
and indiscriminate wage and price controls. See H. LYDALL, YUGOSLAVIA IN CRISIS
(1989). Of course, in accounting for decline, it is difficult to separate the centrifugal
pressures of ethnic and cultural division in an ineffectively coordinated federal system
from the effects of economic policy decisions.
A distinctive arrangement with some kinship to the Yugoslav firm is that of
Bewley's Cafes, a 400 worker restaurant chain in Ireland, which was transferred by its
founder to a trust "for all those working in the firm, past, present and future." R.
OAKESHOVT, THE CASE FOR WORKERS' Co-oPs 79 (1978). The situation of the Bewley
workers resembles that of the Yugoslavs in that each worker participates in the current
profits of the firm, but has no capital stake that she can appropriate on departure. But,
while in both situations the firm capital is subject to a trust for future workers, in the
Bewley firm it is under the direct control of nonworker trustees, while in the Yugoslav
firm it is-in theory-under the direct control of the workers. Arrangements of this
kind are facilitated in Britain by the Industrial Common Ownership Act, 1976, ch. 78;
see R. OAKESHOTT, supra, at 74-107.
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one vote principle, and limits income differentials between the low-
est and highest paid members to a ratio of I to 3 (or 4.5 in excep-
tional cases). Members are paid weekly "advances" (as opposed to
wages) at a fixed rate and then twice annually are paid or credited
with a distribution of net earnings or losses. A portion of the net
earnings is retained as internal equity finance.
1 23
In the Mondragon model, as in conventional cooperatives and
partnerships, each member has an individual account ("internal
capital account"). The account reflects whatever the member paid
upon admission and the member's accumulated shares of retained
earnings and losses. Distribution of earnings and losses is calcu-
lated with a formula that weighs both each member's "pa-
tronage"-hours worked-and the size of her capital account. The
account is adjusted annually to reflect increases in the value of the
firm based on appraisals of its assets. Interest is credited annually
to each account. The accounts, and other rights in the firm, are not
transferable by the members, but on departure the firm pays the
member the amount in her account (though payment may stretch
out over some years).
In contrast to the Yugoslav model, Mondragon permits mem-
bers to capitalize a portion of their economic claims on the firm, but
this portion is smaller than in the unlimited equity model for at
least two reasons. First, although the stipulated price for the re-
demption of membership shares includes some allowance for infla-
tion of individual assets, it excludes goodwill or going concern
value. Moreover, thirty percent of the firm's income is allocated to
collective, rather than individual, accounts that fund insurance and
collective consumption activities such as education and recreation
and, apparently, the subsidization of new entrants who are charged
far less for entry fees than any market measure of the value of the
rights they receive.
124
123. The description of Mondragon in this and the following paragraphs is based on
Ellerman, supra note 98. For a description of an American cooperative based on the
Mondragon model, see the description of the 0 & 0 supermarket chain in Philadelphia
in Kreiner, Worker Ownership as the Basis for an Integrated Proactive Development
Model, 15 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 227 (1986).
124. Ellerman defends the collective reserve as both an accumulation constraint lim-
iting inequality among members and as a safeguard against unrealistic expectations,
minimizing the likelihood that the enterprise will prove unable to redeem its shares at
the stipulated amounts. See Ellerman, supra note 98. The latter explanation seems
weak. The collective reserve reduces the risk of disappointment only by eliminating the
possibility of a more generous return; it is hard to imagine that exiting workers would
prefer this. To the extent that there is a concern that the firm will be insufficiently
liquid to fund redemptions-if for example, many workers retire at the same time-that
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Some features of the Mondragon model are mandated by Span-
ish law on cooperatives. France and Italy, which along with Scan-
dinavia have the most extensive cooperative movements, have
statutes requiring the maintenance of collective reserves that cannot
be individually appropriated on departure.1 25 The cooperative
model promoted by the Knights of Labor in the 1880s was basically
a limited equity model.126
C. ESOPs
Since 1974, the Internal Revenue Code has provided extraordi-
nary tax benefits to employee stock ownership plans, in which em-
ployers fund employee pension benefits with their own stock.
Although the provisions have been defended by the banker Louis
Kelso, a prominent promoter, and Senator Russell Long, their
prime legislative sponsor, in social-republican terms, the plans insti-
tuted under them have not been impressive from a social-republican
point of view. They often give little or no control to employees.
Many plans do not contemplate acquiring a substantial fraction of
voting stock. Many plans provide that a substantial portion of their
voting rights be exercised by trustees, who are appointed by man-
agement (and often are managers themselves), rather than by the
concern could be addressed by provisions for gradual redemption beginning before re-
tirement or extending after it.
125. See COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, III PROSPECTS FOR
WORKERS' COOPERATIVES IN EUROPE (1984). The chapter on France says of the col-
lective reserve that it belongs "to the co-operative as a unit and is in no sense the prop-
erty of the workers-the latter merely have the right to enjoy the benefits deriving from
its use." French cooperative law provides for the redemption of shares at book value
with no adjustment for appreciation. According to the commentators, the "major dif-
ference between a worker cooperative and a conventional company is thus that there is
no possibility of appreciation in the capital value of the business" of the former. Sibille
& Ruatti, Perspectives from France, in id. at F14.
126. See Rules and Regulations of the Jewel Co-operative Knitting Company of St.
Louis, Mo., J. UNITED LAB., June 25, 1885, at 1016-17. The model, which was pro-
posed as containing "the only principles.., which can really and effectually supersede
the wage system," provided that capital shares were to receive a fixed return of eight
percent, workers were (apparently) to receive noncontingent advances (in lieu of wages),
and then net income after the payment of these and other claims was to be divided
equally among capital, labor, and customers. Job vacancies were to be filled by the
enterprise management committee. Capital shares could be held by and transferred to
any member of the Knights. A departing worker could transfer his capital shares, and
thus capitalize anticipated dividend payments, but he could not cash out anticipated
supracompetitive wage premiums by selling his job to a new entrant. This is in contrast
to many contemporary cooperatives, such as the plywood group in the Northwest,
where the newcomers see themselves as "buying a job." Greenberg, Producer Coopera-
tives and Demcoratic Theory: The Case of the Plywood Firms, in WORKER COOPERA-
TIVES IN AMERICA 181 (R. Jackall & H. Levin eds. 1984).
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employee beneficiaries. The statute permits withholding ESOP vot-
ing rights on a variety of issues, including the election of directors,
from employees in privately-held companies; it also permits with-
holding voting rights on all issues in "leveraged" ESOPs to the ex-
tent that stock remains subject to outstanding debt. Managers can
institute and (except in the rare cases where the terms of the plan or
the extent of worker control precludes it) terminates ESOPs with-
out employees' consent. 127 Thus, at most, the ESOP provisions
merely create the possibility of tax-subsidized transfer of control to
employees, a possibility that has been realized in only a small frac-
tion of the plans established under them. 128
Even plans that pass through to workers the voting rights on
controlling blocks of stock may be subject to social-republican ob-
jections. While such plans limit participation to employees, they
may have only weak accumulation constraints. Allocations of stock
to individual participants are based on participants' salaries.
Higher paid employees thus receive more, 129 and senior workers
will develop larger accumulations than junior workers.
In contrast to the typical situation with cooperatives, entering
workers do not need to make a capital contribution to the ESOP.
However, if voting rights are allocated in proportion to share allo-
127. Regarding the minimum requirements for voting rights of stock in tax-subsi-
dized ESOPs, see I.R.C. §§ 409(1), 4975(d)(3), 4975(e)(8) (1988); regarding the mini-
mum requirements for the "pass through" of stock voting rights to employee
beneficiaries, see I.R.C. §§ 401(a)(22), 409(e), 4975(e)(7). The Department of Labor has
taken the positions that the fiduciary norms of the Employee Retirement Income Secur-
ity Act (ERISA) prohibit the "pass through" of votes on "unallocated" shares in lever-
aged ESOPs and that even where a plan may and does "pass through" voting to the
beneficiaries, the trustee retains ultimate responsibility and must disregard the em-
ployee's direction when she determines that it is contrary to the employee's interests in
secure retirement income. See U.S. Dep't of Labor, Opinion Letter on Tender Offers
(Polaroid), 16 Pens. Rep. (BNA) 390 (Feb 23, 1989); U.S. Dep't of Labor, Letter on
Proxy Voting by Plan Fiduciaries (Avon Products), 15 Pens. Rep. (BNA) 391 (Feb. 23,
1988).
Amendments effective in 1990 restrict certain subsidies for leveraged ESOPs to
those in which voting on allocated shares is "passed through" and employees receive
majority voting control. I.R.C. § 133(a)(6)-(7) (West Supp. 1991).
128. See Hansmann, supra note 96, at 1796-80.
129. With the authorization of the tax code, many ESOPs exclude significant cate-
gories of (typically lower-paid) employees, sometimes amounting to a majority of the
work force. J. BLASI, EMPLOYEE OWNERSHIP 142-54 (1988). The code does impose a
(very liberal) cap on the size of subsidized contributions on behalf of any particular
employee, § 415, but under the cap it permits (through the rules regarding the "integra-
tion" of pension plans with Social Security) contributions of a higher percentage of
salary for higher paid-workers than for lower-paid ones. See Altman, Rethinking Re-
tirement Income Policies: Nondiscrimination, Integration, and the Quest for Worker Se-
curity, 42 TAX L. REV. 433 (1987).
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cations, as they presumptively are, then unequal share distributions
will make for unequal control, potentially extremely unequal con-
trol. One response to this problem that has appealed to some
unionists is an ESOP voting trust that requires the trustee to vote
shares as a block in accordance with a participant majority vote, on
a one person-one vote basis. Deborah Olson calls such an arrange-
ment a "cooperative ESOP."'
30
D. The "Job as Property"
Nineteenth century social-republicans saw the wage earner sta-
tus as irreconcilable with social-republican values of independence.
However, in recent decades reformers have speculated that it might
be possible to vindicate social-republican values by reformulating
the employment relation. They have proposed measures, such as
"just cause" termination rules, that constrain the ability of the em-
ployer to use powers of discharge and discipline to subordinate em-
ployees in ways that are not reasonably required by the production
process. The social-republican associations of such doctrines are re-
flected in the suggestion that they imply a vision of "the job as
property."1 31
At the same time, some of the more adventurous recent initia-
tives in work organization have extended some of the characteristics
associated with ownership to workers. Profit sharing and bonus
compensation plans give workers a partial residual claim on enter-
prise earnings. Other reforms extend some incidents of control.
"Team concept" production systems give workers some shop floor
control over the implementation of production procedures. Joint
130. Olson, Union Experiences with Worker Ownership: Legal and Practical Issues
Raised by ESOPs, TRASOP, Stock Purchases, and Co-operatives, 1982 Wis. L. REV.
729, 818-22; see also id. at 757-58.
For small companies (i.e., companies whose stock is not subject to the registration
requirements of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934), the tax code authorizes arrange-
ments in which the trustees vote shares in proportion to the results of a one-per-person
vote by participants. Section 409(e)(5). For example, if 70 participants voted in favor
of a resolution and 30 against it, the trustee would vote 70 percent of the shares in favor
and 30 against regardless of the variations in shareholdings among participants. The
"cooperative ESOP" idea differs from this arrangement in contemplating that, following
the beneficiary vote, the trustee vote all shares in accordance with the views of a major-
ity of the participants. The permissibility of the "cooperative ESOP" is open to doubt,
and indeed in the view of the Labor Department, even clearly permissible (or mandated)
"pass through" voting is subject to the trustees' duty to disregard beneficiary instruc-
tions that she believes are not in the beneficiaries' best interests. See supra note 127.
131. Gould, The Idea of the Job as Property in Contemporary America: The Legal
and Collective Bargaining Framework, 1986 B.Y.U. L. REV. 885 (surveying and arguing
for prohibitions on unjust dismissals).
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labor-management committees sometimes give employees informa-
tion and opportunities to address production design and even strate-
gic business decisions over matters such as product development,
subcontracting, and investment. Such opportunities are rarely ex-
tended as a matter of legally enforceable right, but in a few union-
ized plants they are guaranteed in collective bargaining agre ements.
Worker representation and voting rights on the board of directors
of public corporations have been collectively bargained for in a few
American companies. The more radical of these experiments seem
to erode the line between ownership and employment.
132
More than these organizational experiments, economic devel-
opments over the course of the century have given substance to the
idea of property rights in the job. In recent decades, a large fraction
of American workers have developed long-term associations with a
single employer.1 33 In the more stable and often less competitive
",primary" sector of the labor market, long-term employment is the
norm. A striking fact associated with this system is that once an
employee embarks on a career with a long-term employer her com-
pensation will often exceed that available to her on alternative jobs.
In some industries, this phenomenon is a consequence of personnel
systems that restrict hiring to "ports of entry" at the lower tiers of
job hierarchies and fill higher positions by internal promotion; thus,
comparable jobs at other enterprises for a mid-career worker may
be closed to outsiders. The fact that mid-career employees may
have difficulty finding comparably paid jobs elsewhere is also a
function of compensation structures that reward long-term tenure.
These features in turn reflect the fact that the value of many em-
ployees is in large part a function of on-the-job training and sociali-
zation in skills and attitudes that, because they involve idiosyncratic
aspects of the production process or the ability to collaborate effec-
tively with a unique set of co-workers, are peculiar to the
enterprise. 134
Such developments might seem capable of providing an infra-
structure for a regime of social-republican property. The worker in
a long-term employment relationship who is paid more than she
could get in the external labor market has an economic stake in the
132. See generally T. KOCHAN, H. KATZ & R. MCKERSIE, THE TRANSFORMATION
OF AMERICAN INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS (1986); Simon, The Politics of "Cooperation" at
the Workplace, I RECONSTRUCTION 18 (Winter 1990).
133. Hall, The Importance of Lifetime Jobs in the US. Economy, 72 AM. ECON.
REV. 716 (1982).




enterprise. This stake is nontransferable. It binds her to the enter-
prise in a way analogous to a nontransferable cooperative owner-
ship interest. Of course, to play a meaningful social-republican role,
such an interest would have to be legally secured, whether by strong
collective bargaining guarantees or individual protections such as
"just cause" termination standards. Moreover, it would have to be
complemented by accumulation constraints that would permit
workers to participate in control and would limit inequality in con-
trol and reward. 135 Strong unions sometimes perform that role;
some new experiments in work reorganization also take steps in this
direction.
E. Interfirm Coordination
A variety of activities facilitate collaboration among separate
firms, for example, price fixing, prescribing and maintaining quality
standards, collecting and disseminating information, training and
allocating workers, purchasing supplies, securing credit, and re-
searching and marketing products. These activities are organized in
a variety of ways. In agriculture, collective supply purchasing and
marketing activities typically take the form of cooperatives, and
farmers sometimes collaborate to produce power or water in coop-
eratives or mutual companies. Craft labor unions in, for example,
the construction and garment industries, perform worker training
and referral functions. Information, research, and standard setting
activities are often organized by trade associations.
Such institutions played a central role in the 19th century so-
cial-republican visions of, for example, the Farmers' Alliance and
the Knights of Labor, where they were expected to moderate the
pressures of price and wage competition and enable small producers
to attain economies of scale. 136 Much of the extensive producer co-
operative sectors in France, Italy, and Scandinavia are linked by
135. Wage patterns in many mainstream enterprises seem to reflect at least implicit
accumulation constraints. Unions typically bargain for more egalitarian wage distribu-
tions than prevail in nonunion plants. R. FREEMAN & J. MEDOFF, WHAT Do UNIONS
Do? 79-82 (1984). And nonunion employers often create wage distributions far more
equal than the distributions of their employees' marginal products, even when marginal
products are readily measureable. Frank, Are Workers Paid Their Marginal Products?,
74 AM. ECON. REV. 549 (1984).
136. L. GOODWYN, supra note 3. The Knights' system is described in detail in C.
HORNER, PRODUCERS' COOPERATIVES IN THE UNITED STATES, 1865-1890 (Ph. D.
diss., Univ. of Pittsburgh, 1978).
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associations that provide credit and technical assistance. 137
Michael Piore and Charles Sabel have recently pointed to the analo-
gous role of such institutions in a variety of contemporary industrial
districts and networks and argued that they have fostered techno-
logical dynamism and flexible adaptation to changing markets.
138
American antitrust law reflects a classical liberal suspicion of
such activities to the extent that they inhibit price competition (as
well as a relative tolerance for the kind of coordination that occurs
through the agglomeration of small firms into large ones). Labor
and agriculture benefit from limited antitrust exemptions, but in
nonagricultural product markets, the antitrust law prohibits such
activities where they constrain price competition.
1 39
For our purposes, the important point is that the organization
of such activities often has social-republican characteristics. As-
sociations for the joint purchasing of supplies or marketing of prod-
ucts are typically organized as cooperatives; we have already noted
that the tax and antitrust provisions benefitting cooperatives impose
significant transfer and accumulation restraints, and members often
voluntarily adopt additional ones. 140
Labor unions are required by statute to accord control to mem-
bers on the basis of one person, one vote. They do not permit the
transfer of membership rights. Members cannot individually capi-
talize their rights to collective capital. Union property is typically
held in trust for the membership, and constitutions often provide
that property go on dissolution to a related union organization.
141
Trade associations are usually organized under nonprofit cor-
poration statutes reflecting the common-law principles of voluntary
137. COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, supra note 125, at vol. II,
DK1 1-5 (on Denmark); vol. III, F31-6 (on France); vol. III, 11-25 (on Italy); M. BEST,
supra note 31, at 209-25 (on Italy).
138. M. PIORE & C. SABEL, supra note 1, at 265-75 (1984).
139. Eg., Northwest Wholesale Stationers v. Pacific Stationery & Printing Co., 472
U.S. 284 (1985); see also Fashion Originators' Guild of America v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457
(1941).
140. See supra notes 112-113 and accompanying text. Supply and marketing coop-
eratives are pervasive in agriculture. Wholesale supply cooperatives serving retailers are
significant in a variety of consumer goods businesses, notably groceries, hardware, and
baking. Hansmann, Ownership of the Firm, 4 J. LAW, ECON. & ORGANIZATION 267,
285-91 (1988).
141. Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, § 101(a)(1), 29
U.S.C. § 41 l(a)(1) (1988); LABOR RELATIONS AND THE LAW 973-74 (R. Mathews ed.
1953). At common law, unions were and are voluntary associations, subject in the ab-
sence of relevant statute or agreement to default principles that have a highly social-
republican character. E.g., Harris v. Backman, 160 Or. 520, 86 P.2d 456 (1939); Local
Union No. 1, Textile Workers v. Barrett, 19 R.I. 663, 36 A. 5 (1896).
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association. Memberships are not transferable. Voting is some-
times proportional to the size of dues payments, but is more often
on a one-vote-per-member basis. Members cannot individually ap-
propriate capital except on dissolution.142
Thus, the principal types of institutions of interfirm coopera-
tives each frequently manifest social-republican characteristics.
V. THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF SOCIAL-REPUBLICAN
PROPERTY
Liberalism is the perspective from which republican and social-
ist ideas are most often and distinctly criticized. While there are
myriad liberal criticisms relevant to social-republican property, two
seem especially interesting, the first because of its prevalence, the
second because of its plausibility.
The first criticism is that there is a strong trade-off between
equality and economic productivity, and that social-republican
property sacrifices the latter to the former. 143 The second is that
142. G. LAMB & C. SHIELDS, TRADE ASSOCIATION LAW AND PRACTICE 217-21
(1971).
Two features that one might expect to find in all forms of social-republican eco-
nomic organization are, first, forfeitable membership, and, second, protection against
arbitrary forfeiture. In the conventional corporation, individual investors, once admit-
ted, cannot normally be involuntarily excluded (except in connection with certain fun-
damental restructurings of the business). In the classical at-will employment relation,
employees can be excluded arbitrarily. By contrast, in the social-republican enterprise,
members should not be exempt from expulsion, since the enterprise is premised on mu-
tual trust and cooperation among members. At the same time, members should be
protected against arbitrary exclusion, since they have an interest in the enterprise that is
not fully compensated by the redemption of their membership on departure.
We have seen that this principle is explicitly recognized in the common law of
voluntary associations, which permits expulsion but requires that it be for valid reasons
and in accordance with fair procedures. See supra note 85 and accompanying text. The
common law principle has been applied to trade associations and labor unions. E.g.,
Polin v. Kaplan, 257 N.Y. 277, 177 N.E. 833 (1931). It is quite similar to the "just
cause" dismissal doctrine a few states have applied to employees. The common law
protects partnership interests with an analogous though slightly weaker standard re-
quiring "good faith" (though not necessarily fair process) in expulsion decisions. E.g.,
Holman v. Coie, 11 Wash. App. 195, 522 P.2d 515 (1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 984
(1975). Curiously, there is no such general common law principle for cooperatives,
though the Sherman Act applies one to interfirm cooperatives (as well as to trade as-
sociations), Northwest Wholesale Stationers v. Pacific Stationery & Printing Co., 472
U.S. 284 (1985); Silver v. New York Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341 (1963), and producer
cooperative by-laws typically contain "just cause" and due process provisions.
Of course, the interests of homeowners and tenants discussed in Part III are typi-
cally protected by requirements of judicial process in connection with dispossession.
E.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 1159-1179a (West 1982).
143. See 0. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM 265-68
(1985); Hansmann, supra note 96; Jensen & Meckling, Rights and Production Functions:
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social-republican property achieves intrapolitical equality only at
the expense of extrapolitical inequality, generating solidarity among
the members of the communities it constitutes only by excluding
outsiders who would be admitted into a polity attuned to liberal
principles. 1"
I am not prepared to offer here a full assessment of these criti-
cisms but rather two brief suggestions. First, there is an important
strand of contemporary economic discourse that is responsive to the
first criticism and resonates with the social-republican view even
when it does not use its rhetoric. One can hardly say that this dis-
course resolves the issue in favor of the social-republican view, but
one can say that there is economically informed support for some
major premises of that view. The second criticism is more troub-
ling. It points to a tension in the doctrine's most basic commit-
ments that social-republicans have not adequately addressed.145
The discussion here is confined to some general presumptions
about social-republican property at a fairly abstract level, although
the evaluation of any specific social-republican reform would cer-
An Application to Labor-Managed Firms and Codetermination, 52 J. Bus. L. 469 (1979).
Jensen and Meckling focus on the Yugoslav model. Hansmann's model disclaims
strong transfer or financial accumulation constraints and hence represents a much
weaker form of social-republican enterprise.
144. Although formulated in my own terms, this criticism draws on (1) the neoclas-
sical economic critique of the producer cooperative or "Illyrian firm," see J. BONIN &
L. PUTrERMAN, supra note 114, at 13-79, and (2) recent social-democratic critiques of
what one might call the cultural republicanism inspired by Pocock, see Bell & Bansal,
The Republican Revival and Racial Politics, 97 YALE L.J. 1609, 1612-15 (1988); Free-
man & Mensch, A Republican Agenda for Hobbesian America, 41 U. FLA. L. REv. 581,
606-11 (1989).
145. A third criticism that I will not take up in the text asserts that social-republican
property interests are hard to enforce. The problem here is that the residual capital
interest in social-republican property belongs either to the public at large or to some
indeterminate group that includes future, as yet unidentified, members of the enterprise
or organization. This means that enforcement must rest significantly on outsiders-
state officials or members of associations such as community development corporations
with monitoring functions-and these enforcers will lack both the incentives and the
information that a private capital owner typically has to enforce her property rights.
The criticism identifies a real problem with many social-republican property inter-
ests. For example, enforcing restrictions against the subleasing at market rates of rent-
controlled and limited equity housing is quite difficult. How telling this objection is
depends on how we frame the comparison with liberal or social-democratic property
regimes. If social-republican property is viewed in comparison with private capital in-
terests, the enforcement process seems easier for the latter (though by no means un-
problematic where, for example, the owner is a corporate shareholder). On the other
hand, if we compare social-republican property enforcement with the enforcement of
social-democratic tax and welfare interests (since social-republican property regimes are
partial substitutes for tax-transfer redistribution), the problems of the former do not
seem especially severe.
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tainly turn on a variety of specific contextual features. I have in
mind an economy where social-republican property is created either
on wholly private initiative or through tax and regulatory regimes
and as conditions on public or charitable grants or subsidies, and
where it coexists with liberal private property (and other forms).
Thus, I exclude an economy such as pre-1988 Yugoslavia's, where
classical liberal property was prohibited in important sectors.
A. The Potential Efficiency of Social-Republican Property
1. Social-Republican Property v. Casino Capitalism
Social-republican property is inefficient by definition under
some liberal definitions of efficiency, since it creates individual inter-
ests that cannot be exchanged even in circumstances where the
owner and a willing purchaser would find it in their interests to do
so. Nevertheless, under a slightly more expansive notion of effi-
ciency, two sorts of arguments can be made for the potential effi-
ciency of social-republican property. The first associates social-
republican property with psychological or cultural dispositions
favorable to productivity. The second sees social-republican prop-
erty as a response to limitations of the market in coordinating indi-
vidual choices in the workplace.
The first argument is the most difficult to formulate and sub-
stantiate, but elements of it seem to have intuitive plausibility to a
broad range of people. The argument is that the set of attitudes
associated with commodification that republicanism and socialism
see as inimical to individual dignity and communal integrity are
also inimical to productivity. Part of the argument is that narrowly
economistic calculation often leads to short-sighted judgments that
frustrate long-run self-interest. But another, more elusive part is
that both individual and collective welfare often require that indi-
viduals suspend economistic calculation, because people are often
most productive when they see their work as a form of self-expres-
sion rather than as a commodity. As John Maynard Keynes wrote,
"If human nature felt... no satisfaction (profit apart) in construct-
ing a factory, a railway, a mine or a farm, there might not be much
investment merely as a result of cold calculation." 146
Commodification undermines the sense of intrinsic satisfaction
in economic activities by eroding the sense of connection between
the activity of work and its social meaning and by eroding the expe-




rience of work as membership in a community. Taken to an ex-
treme this objection-for example, in the Utopian socialist
exaltation of "use" value over "exchange" value-would lead to a
repudiation of markets entirely. More commonly, the social-repub-
lican objection has focused only on capital markets and on two as-
pects of these markets that are nicely represented by two images
Keynes invoked in his General Theory. In one, he compared the
investment process to the card game "Old Maid" in which the ob-
ject is to pass the Old Maid card to someone else before the game is
over; in the other, he compared it to
those newspaper competitions in which the competitors have to
pick out the six prettiest faces from a hundred photographs, the
prize being awarded to the competitor whose choice most nearly
corresponds to the average preferences of the competitors as a
whole; so that each competitor has to pick, not those faces which
he himself finds prettiest, but those which he thinks likeliest to
catch the fancy of the other competitors, all of whom are looking
at the problem from the same point of view. 147
Part of Keynes's and the social-republican concern is simply
the volatility of these markets; community requires more stability
than these markets will tolerate. Another, more elusive dimension
of the problem seems to involve what the republicans call corrup-
tion and the socialists call alienation. In this context, both terms
connote the attenuation of the relation between the identity of the
producer and the assets she works with. This attenuation occurs
when owners start to view their assets, first, as something to be
traded rather than worked, and second, as something whose value is
determined by speculative opinion rather than by appraisals of the
worth of what it will produce. 148 The shared intuition of Keynes
and the social-republican view is that this attenuation leads to a
weakening of the effort and imagination (or as Keynes put it,
"animal spirits") on the part of the producer. To some extent, this
weakening may be a matter of the distractions from production of
the constant signaling of the asset market. More fundamentally, it
seems to involve a psychological shift toward complacency about
production.
147. Id. at 155-56.
148. "Speculative opinion" here means "the activity of forecasting the psychology of
the market" as opposed to "the activity of forecasting the prospective yield of assets
over their whole life." Id. at 158. Although social-republican rhetoric against specula-
tion does not distinguish the two explicitly, I have the impression that its strongest
objections were to investment associated with the former.
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Keynes considered (though he ultimately rejected) a categori-
cal prohibition on the alienation of capital as a response to the psy-
chological problem (and to others).149 The social-republican
approach to property is a more flexible set of measures along this
line. In theory it supports the maintenance of productive communi-
ties both by reducing the volatility of capital market pressures and
by inhibiting the culturally corrosive effects of speculation.
This line of thought bears some relation to the recent critique
of the corporate takeover phenomenon that finds a debilitating psy-
chological effect on management resulting from the takeover
threat.150 The related proposals to inhibit the takeover process are
in some respects akin to the transfer restraints of social-republican
property. Social-republican concerns also resonate with the sugges-
tion that the recent tendency in managerial recruitment to favor
legal and financial backgrounds over engineering ones has adversely
affected productivity. The complaint here is that legal and financial
training discourages interest in production and personal identifica-
tion with products.151
The'second type of argument focuses on the fact that a broad
range of important types of production requires illiquid, long-term
investments. From the social-republican perspective, the most per-
tinent of such investments are those that resist commodification be-
cause they are embedded in particular relationships. One
investment of this kind is individual education in knowledge or
skills that is distinctively useful within the enterprise, venture, or
bounded economic community. Another is education about the
particular characteristics of another participant or potential partici-
pant in a common endeavor. Employers make such investments in
recruiting and screening new employees; old employees make such
investments when they train new employees, and we might consider
this process an investment by the new employees as well. Enter-
prises make such investments in learning about their customers,
suppliers, and trading partners. This. type of learning might focus
on both the reliability of the prospective collaborator and the taste
and technical characteristics that define her needs (as a customer)
-or capabilities (as a supplier).
149. Id. at 160-61.
150. Eg., R. REICH, THE NEXT AMERICAN FRONTIER 140-72 (1983); Drucker,
Corporate Takeovers--What Is To Be Done?, 82 PUB. INTEREST 3 (1986).
151. Hayes & Abernathy, Managing Our Way to Economic Decline, HARV. Bus.
REV., July-Aug. 1980, at 74-76. David Halberstam's account of the postwar decline of
the Ford Motor Company in D. HALBERSTAM, THE RECKONING (1986), is an ex-
tended illustration of this thesis.
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Finally, a third related type of investment is the development
of effective modes of collaboration. For example, employers may
invest in professional services to train employees how to work to-
gether; even if they do not, the earlier stages of collaboration, when
workers are necessarily experimenting and learning about alterna-
tive modes of working together, constitute a kind of investment in
which lower short-term productivity is accepted as the price of
learning that will eventually enhance long-term productivity. Ini-
tial relations between customers and suppliers or trading partners
may also involve this kind of investment.
Such investments, where effective, create what some econo-
mists might call firm-specific human capital (recognizing that such
capital may be involved in informal business relations and relations
among, as well as within, firms). Such capital is likely to be a major
source of an enterprise's goodwill or going concern value-the mea-
sure of the extent to which the value of the whole enterprise exceeds
that of the sum of its parts.
The basic mechanisms of coordination associated with the
market often seem inadequate for coordinating such investments.
Spot markets are inadequate because firm-specific human capital in-
vestments require long-term coordination. Elaborately specified
contracts are ineffective because the relevant contingencies are un-
foreseeable and contractual specification inefficiently rigidifies the
relationship.
Yet, without specified contractual safeguards, collaborative be-
havior may make cooperators vulnerable in ways that deter people
from engaging in it. Participants who invest in firm-specific assets
risk that the others on whom the value of the assets depend will
defect from the relationship when it is individually advantageous
for them to do so. Employers who invest in employees risk that the
employees will leave. Workers who invest in firm-specific skills risk
that the employers will discharge them. Workers who help other
workers acquire skills risk that those they help will displace them.
Firms face similar risks in imparting valuable information to poten-
tial collaborators (who may also be potential competitors) or in un-
dertaking efforts to learn about or develop relations with them. The
value of such investments depends on the willingness of the others
to continue collaboration even in situations where short-term indi-
vidual interests might discourage it. The market, as portrayed in
the economics and contract law associated with classical liberalism,
seems incapable of facilitating long-term flexible cooperation.
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From this perspective, the incomplete commodification or i-
quidity of firm-specific human capital may be a redeeming virtue.
Legal and economic arrangements that make it more difficult or
costly for parties to withdraw from the relationship may serve as
safeguards that induce firm-specific human capital investments by
reducing the risk of subsequent opportunistic withdrawal. For ex-
ample, long-term employment guarantees may induce employee in-
vestments; deferred compensation arrangements may induce
employer investments in employees. They do so, not by compre-
hensively specifying contingent obligations, but by locking the par-
ties into a relationship in which each has an incentive to cooperate
with the other while the specific contours of the collaboration re-
main undetermined.
Firm-specific human capital investments tend to reduce the ex-
ternal pressures of labor and product markets on the enterprise and
to open space for political decisionmaking within the enterprise.
This type of capital is embodied in the incumbent participants.
Moreover, it is often inherently collective; no individual could ap-
propriate his share simply by withdrawing unilaterally or threaten-
ing to do so. The external market prices for the participants'
services are considerably less than their value to the enterprise.
Since fully specified contracts are not possible and external markets
do not fully determine distribution among participants, the partici-
pants have significant collective discretion to determine distribution
themselves in terms of norms distinctive to their own
community. 152
152. The argument above generalizes a point made about law firms by Gilson &
Mnookin, supra note 96, at 353-71. For more general analyses in this spirit, see, M.
AOKI, THE COOPERATIVE GAME THEORY OF THE FIRM 102-13 (1984); P. DOERINGER
& M. PIORE, supra note 134, at 89-90; 0. WILLIAMSON, supra note 143, at 242-50.
Given the relatively small number of worker-owned enterprises, their many and
wide variations, and the idiosyncratic circumstances under which they tend to emerge,
systematic empirical inquiry into the relative productivity of such enterprises is difficult.
A survey of the empirical efforts to date concludes that there is no evidence that worker
ownership has a negative effect on productivity. See Conte & Svejnar, The Performance
Effects of Employee Ownership Plans, in PAYING FOR PRODUCTIVITY 143, 170-71 (A.
Blinder ed. 1990). Most studies do not distinguish worker-owned firms with strong
social-republican features from those without them. There are two studies comparing
performance among cooperatives that purport to find some indication that collective as
opposed to individual ownership of capital (as represented by nonappropriable reserves)
has a negative productivity effect, but the findings are weak and ambiguous (and appar-
ently, the specification of collective capital is based on accounting figures that exclude
important intangibles). See Jones & Backus, British Producer Cooperatives in the Foot-
wear Industry: An Empirical Evaluation of the Theory of Financing, 87 ECON. J. 488
(1977); Jones & Svejnar, Participation, Profit Sharing, Worker Ownership, and Efficiency
in Italian Producer Cooperatives, 52 ECONOMICA 449 (1985). In their survey, Conte
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Such decisionmaking may be done through hierarchical admin-
istrative means, but it can also be done through relatively demo-
cratic political means. The latter have at least two potential
advantages. First, they may be better at surfacing information
about the preferences and goals of the participants that is necessary
to reach the most efficient accommodation. Second, the process of
participation in decisionmaking may make for greater acceptance of
or commitment to the decisions by the participants.
Thus, both the transfer and the accumulation constraints asso-
ciated with social-republican property seem consistent with the de-
velopment of firm-specific human capital. In areas of enterprise
where the prospects for such investments are good, social-republi-
can institutions may be conducive to, or at least compatible with,
productive efficiency.
Conversely, areas where enterprises lack the potential to de-
velop firm-specific human capital or goodwill are less likely candi-
dates for social-republican organization. Two other negative
indications for social-republican organization are relatively high dif-
ferences in the external market capacities of the participants and
relatively high demands for physical capital. Where external mar-
ket capacities are unequal, the more powerful are likely to demand
proportionately greater power and compensation within the enter-
prise. Interests in firm-specific human capital may constrain such
demands, but at some point external inequalities are likely to over-
come such constraints. Where firms have high demands for physi-
cal capital, they are likely to have to resort to external finance, and
considerations of both efficiency and democracy often suggest that
external finance of physical capital should be accompanied by exter-
nal control. (The concept of worker control seems undemocratic in
the context of capital-intensive industry, since it implies that here
workers should have control of productive resources vastly dispro-
portionate to their numbers.)
2. Some Counter-Arguments
The conclusion that social-republican enterprise, as exemplified
most notably by producer cooperatives, is potentially efficient in a
significant range of circumstances has been disputed extensively.
Three arguments are most commonly made for the presumptive
inefficiency of such enterprise: first, it requires a degree of collective
and Svejnar conclude that "the efficiency effects of collective ownership remain un-
clear." Conte & Svejnar, supra, at 169 n.32.
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decisionmaking that is relatively costly in circumstances of diverse
preferences and interests; second, worker ownership typically re-
quires that workers make financial investments in their firms in ad-
dition to the human capital investments they necessarily make,
making workers excessively vulnerable to firm and industry-specific
business risks; third, worker-owned enterprises will have an inef-
ficiently "short time horizon."' 153
The first argument has been made recently by Henry
Hansmann. 15 4 Hansmann points out that decisions by absentee in-
vestor-owners are simplified by their common interest in a limited
unitary goal-profit. When owners are also workers, ownership de-
cisions involve more variables and become more complex. The pro-
cess of making decisions is more time-consuming and hence costly,
and since there is no sure-fire method for reconciling divergent
goals so as to maximize group welfare, the risk of poor decisions is
greater. These costs and risks increase with the heterogeneity of the
workforce that results from differences in backgrounds, skills, and
positions in the division of labor. Thus, Hansmann finds it plausible
that costs might be sufficiently small with work forces that are rela-
tively homogeneous in such respects, such as corporate law firms.
However, he thinks the costs of collective decision are likely to be
prohibitive with any substantially heterogeneous workforce, and he
finds that most of the successful examples of worker ownership in-
volve homogeneous workforces.
The social-republican argument shares substantial common
ground with Hansmann (by no means an unbending critic of worker
ownership). A social-republican might be more optimistic about
the possibilities of efficient resolution of differing preferences, but
she would be the first to insist that substantial inequalities of power
(whether due to outside market opportunities or internal political
capacities) would be inimical to organizational success. Moreover,
Hansmann's conclusion that worker ownership does not work with
heterogeneous workforces depends on a fairly demanding definition
of worker ownership involving direct worker management. He con-
cedes that a more modest version in which a management subject to
limited worker electoral control manages the corporation "in the
interest of the workers" might be viable with a heterogeneous
workforce, and he interprets Mondragon as a successful example of
153. See supra note 143 and accompanying text. For a longer list of objections and
some responses to them, see Elster, From Here to There; or, If Cooperative Ownership Is
So Desirable, Why Are There So Few Cooperatives?, 6 Soc. PHIL. & POL'Y 93 (1989).
154. Hansmann, supra note 96, at 1790-94 (emphasis in original).
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this version. 155 This seems a substantial concession; the worker
owners in such an enterprise would probably have considerably
more power than most shareholder-owners in the typical public
corporation.
Still, even with such qualifications, Hansmann's conclusion
seems too pessimistic. If workforce heterogeneity tends to increase
decisionmaking costs, there are two possible responses: we can try
to narrow the range of worker decisionmaking, or we can try to
decrease worker heterogeneity. Hansmann's conclusion seems to
focus on the former response, but he acknowledges the latter and
indeed mentions examples of it. For example, the worker-owners of
the successful plywood cooperatives in the Pacific Northwest limit
specialization and rotate members through all production jobs in
order to minimize differences in knowledge and skills and differ-
ences in interest arising from different positions in the division of
labor. 1 56 No doubt such firms also try to recruit workers who share
values with existing members and are good at collective decision-
making, and perhaps they also try to induce such values and skills
through training.
Hansmann's pessimism seems to depend on an assumption that
intractable social or technological constraints mandate forms of or-
ganization involving high degrees of heterogeneity. However, re-
cent research on and experience with mass production
manufacturing caution against reliance on such assumptions. The
research disputes that the highly hierarchical and specialized mode
of organization that dominated the economy for most of this cen-
tury was ever the only efficient way such production could have
been organized. The experience suggests that, whatever the case in
the past, it is unlikely to continue to be the dominant paradigm in
the future. The direction of the most innovative segments of the
economy seems to be toward a flattening of hierarchy and a de-
crease in specialization.'
57
Moreover, even if we grant that the costs of collective decision-
making are irremediably high with heterogeneous workforces, it
does not follow that the proper response is to narrow the range of
worker decision, or that worker ownership is inefficient. The judg-
ment on worker ownership is a comparative one, and the relevant
155. Id.
156. Id. at 1785-90.
157. See M. PIORE & C. SABEL, supra note 1; Sabel & Zeitlin, HistoricalAlternatives
to Mass Production, 108 PAST & PRESENT 133, 133 (1985); Who Needs a Boss?, FOR-
TUNE, May 7, 1990, at 52.
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comparison is not between the ease of decisionmaking among
worker-owners on the one hand and among investor-owners on the
other, but between the ease of decisionmaking of worker-owners on
the one hand and among investor-owners plus employees on the
other. The greater ease of collective decisionmaking in the investor-
owned firm is achieved by ignoring employee interests or by relegat-
ing them to nonownership decision processes or both. The costs of
ignoring employee interests (which may be borne by the employer if
the employees are able to insist on compensating wage differentials)
and of these nonownership decision processes have to be taken into
account in the comparative assessment. In unionized firms, the an-
cillary processes take the form of democratic voting procedures
among workers (a structure Hansmann found inefficient in the
worker ownership context, but which, given worker rights of self-
organization, is potentially an element of almost any form of organi-
zation) coupled with a collective bargaining process with
management.
The new learning on work organization often suggests that the
costs both of inadequate consideration of employee interests and of
cumbersome decisionmaking procedures have been high in many
traditionally organized investor-owned firms. The degree of control
given management in these firms simplified collective decisionmak-
ing among managers but entailed an elaborate and often costly bar-
gaining process to secure the necessary agreement among workers
(who had to shoulder costs of collective decisionmaking among
themselves in this process). From the employees' point of view, the
traditional allocation of control now seems inefficient because it
made expectations of job security unenforceable. In the more stable
business environment of the pre-1970s postwar era, workers could
more easily achieve job security without control over strategic in-
vestment and business decisions, but in recent years, job security
has seemed to require limitation of managerial discretion over such
matters as subcontracting, investment, and even pricing. From
management's point of view, the old model sometimes seems ineffi-
cient because, in the absence of direct control over strategic deci-
sions or direct guarantees of job security, employees bargained
successfully for indirect substitutes that rigidified the production
process, such as elaborate work rules, classifications, and seniority
rules. Many mainstream managers have come to believe that a
model that allowed more employee control over strategic decisions
and more direct job security in return for more flexibility in the
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production process would be more efficient than the traditional hi-
erarchical one. 15
Contingent compensation, and participation in strategic, plant,
and shop floor level decisions are all features of current mainstream
experiments in industrial organization. These are the incidents of
worker ownership. To be sure, few of the current experiments ap-
proach full worker ownership, and many extend control rights as a
matter of managerial discretion rather than of worker right. How-
ever, such experiments imply a dissatisfaction with the traditional
model which should preclude one from inferring from its previous
preeminence that its allocation of control was uniquely or distinc-
tively efficient.
The second claim against worker ownership is that it precludes
adequate diversification of workers' wealth and thus subjects them
excessively to the risks of a particular industry or business. 59 Since
workers already have large human capital investments in the firm,
the argument goes, for them to invest their financial assets there too
would be foolhardy. Better that they be compensated in wages and
save a portion in some diversified fund.
There are several answers to this claim. First, there is a trade-
off between efficient diversification and efficient allocation of incen-
tives. A worker whose investments (including human capital ones)
were fully diversified would be indifferent to the fate of the firm.
The larger the investment in the firm, the larger the worker's inter-
est in its success. Of course, it does not follow from the fact that the
worker is strongly interested in the firm's success that she has
strong incentives to do her job well; the success of the firm depends
on many things other than what any individual does, and the
worker may feel that improving her own performance would make
little difference in the firm's prospects for success. Still, with rela-
tively small workforces and large ownership stakes, one might ex-
pect ownership to have an important effect on performance.
Moreover, even in larger enterprises, workers may devise modes of
informal mutual monitoring that give each worker the sense that
good performance will be reciprocated and bad performance
sanctioned. 160
158. See, e.g., T. KOCHAN, H. KATZ & R. MCKERSIE, supra note 132; Simon, supra
note 132, at 18.
159. See, e.g., Jensen & Meckling, supra note 143.
160. Effective informal mutual monitoring is one explanation for the substantial
body of evidence that profit sharing, which involves some of the incentives and risks of
1991] 1397
UCLA LAW REVIEW
It is also possible that worker financial investments will have
important psychological effects in conjunction with organizational
reforms. Low-income protest organizations typically charge admis-
sion fees or dues large enough to represent a significant sacrifice by
the member, though often too small to be an important source of
organizational finance, because they feel it gives the paying member
a sense of power that encourages participation and signals to the
other members that the paying member is committed to the organi-
zation. 161 Even where financial investments by workers in owner-
ship create only small individual interests, the process of making
the investments may create a strong collective sense of identity that
motivates group collaboration and mutual monitoring.
Second, the diversification criticism assumes that in exchange
for ownership the workers must make financial investments in addi-
tion to the human capital investments they make as employees. It is
surely plausible that outside capital suppliers will insist on some
control as well as financial return. However, the premise that con-
trol should go exclusively to financial capital suppliers and their
agents is not so obvious. In Germany, workers receive seats on the
board merely by virtue of their status as employees, and we have
noted that in many American companies workers share in rights
traditionally identified with ownership.' 62 It is possible that in
some companies workers could be given partial "ownership" more
formally without additional financial investments and without in-
creasing prohibitively the cost of outside capital.
Third, if control is valuable to employees, it may be worth the
costs of added risks. Investors pay premiums all the time in both
cash and risk in order to achieve control. One narrowly economic
ownership, enhances employee productivity. Weitzman & Kruse, Profit Sharing and
Productivity, in PAYING FOR PRODUCTIVITY, supra note 152, at 98-100.
Ironically, the most striking direct evidence of the potential efficacy of informal
mutual monitoring by workers comes from worker efforts to restrict productivity. In
conventional capitalist firms, it has often been the case that individual workers have
substantial incentives to exceed production standards in ways that disadvantage work-
ers as a group-for example, where such "ratebusting" leads the employer to raise the
standards for everyone. In many settings, informal work groups have proven highly
effective at enforcing their own norms of reasonable production despite the collective
action problems in doing so and sometimes despite employer prohibition of their efforts.
See S. MATHEWSON, RESTRICTION OF OUTPUT AMONG UNORGANIZED WORKERS
15-29 (1931). An advantage of worker ownership is that it realigns the incentives for
such informal activity toward productivity.
161. See, e.g., L. BAILIS, BREAD OR JUSTICE: GRASSROOTS ORGANIZING IN THE
WELFARE RIGHTS MOVEMENT 43 (1974).
162. See Summers, An American Perspective of the German Model of Worker Partici-
pation, 8 COMp. LAB. L.J. 333, 339-40 (1987), and sources cited supra note 158.
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reason why employees might value control is to safeguard job secur-
ity, since it has proven difficult to achieve such security through
contractual specification. And job security may motivate firm-spe-
cific human capital investments as well as day-to-day effort.
Finally, the social-republican tradition has distinctive measures
to achieve risk-spreading while preserving worker control. The ba-
sic idea is a form of insurance among independent enterprises ad-
ministered cooperatively. The plan of the Farmers' Alliance, in
which members would jointly pledge their lands as security for the
repayment of debts for cooperatively purchased supplies, is a nota-
ble example, though the diversification achieved there was quite
limited. 163 The Knights of Labor envisioned and experimented
with a system in which the union operated as a confederation of
members of independent cooperative enterprises, giving members fi-
nancial assistance in times of distress. 164
The Mondragon system of cooperatives has a more elaborate
system of interrelations. The cooperatives are engaged in a fairly
diverse array of businesses. The high-earning cooperatives make
payments to low-earning ones in order to narrow short-term in-
tercooperative profit variation. This program is administered by a
central institution governed by officers appointed by the member
cooperatives. The individual cooperatives are also shareholders of a
bank that finances new cooperatives and gives assistance to troubled
ones. 165
Such arrangements may seem compatible with social-republi-
can principles as long as the central institution is democratically
controlled by its members. Nevertheless, there is still a substantial
trade-off between worker control at the enterprise level and efficient
diversification. Efficient diversification probably requires a fairly
large pool of members, and effective insurance probably requires
substantial central monitoring and control of members. -Thus,
members will have to cede some control to the central institution,
and the larger the central institution, the less likely that members
will feel a sense of participation and control in it. Still, inter-enter-
prise cooperation at a scale that preserves the possibilities of rank-
and-file control may substantially diversify risk.
The third complaint about social-republican organization is
that the members of such organizations tend to have short invest-
163. L. GOODWYN, supra note 3, at 74-80.
164. C. HORNER, supra note 136, at 188-216 (1978).
165. See W. WHYTE & K. WHYTE, supra note 98, at 61-62, 68-87.
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ment horizons. 166 The implicit comparison here is to the outside-
investor-controlled firm with liquid, tradeable claims. The idea is
that an investor in such a firm is indifferent to when the enterprise
will realize the income from a particular investment because she can
always cash in her share of the enterprise's anticipated future earn-
ings for a present lump sum. A social-republican investor, on the
other hand, may be able to benefit from a particular enterprise in-
vestment only if she is still a member when the enterprise realizes
the income. She may thus be reluctant to have the enterprise under-
take projects that will not have paid off fully by the time she antici-
pates leaving.
One response to this complaint is that the ideal of the outside-
investor-controlled firm with tradeable claims seems to be only
partly feasible. Certainly, this model does not fully describe the
typical large public corporation, which is not investor-controlled, or
the typical small business, on which claims are not readily trade-
able. The investment policies of large corporations are often influ-
enced by managers and unions whose primary interest is in
employment compensation during their tenures. (Takeovers seem
to many observers to exacerbate, rather than mitigate, the short
term bias of managers and employees.) Small businesses often have
a large human capital component embedded in relations between
existing manager-owners and their workers, and high information
costs relative to firm value impede trading of claims. Thus, one of
the more common uses of ESOPs is in sales of small businesses by
departing founders to their employees.
Moreover, a broad range of firms will likely have age composi-
tions for which the time constraint on investment is irrelevant. As
Henry Hansmann writes:
[E]ven if workers could never withdraw capital from the firm, the
workers as a group might be expected to have a long time hori-
zon for investments since the median worker's expected length of
tenure with the firm may well be as long as fifteen or twenty
years, or even longer if pension payoff periods are included. And
a fifteen-year investment horizon is extremely long by contempo-
rary industrial standards.1
67
3. Why Are There So Few Worker Cooperatives?
Critics of worker ownership often ask, if worker ownership is
efficient, why do we see so few worker-owned enterprises in capital-
166. See, e.g., Jensen & Meckling, supra note 143, at 481-84.
167. Hansmann, supra note 96, at 1774 (citation omitted).
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ist societies? Capitalist legal regimes are ostensibly neutral toward
this form of ownership, 168 and the market would reward it if it were
comparatively efficient.
Defenders often suggest that capitalists discriminate against
worker-owned enterprises by denying them capital or refusing to
deal with them without regard to efficiency. There certainly have
been examples of such discrimination. 1 69 But there is no evidence
of discrimination on a scale that would account for the small
number of worker-owned enterprises.
Another explanation is that in a conventional capitalist envi-
ronment, enterprises that start out as worker-owned may encounter
strong incentives to shift to an investor-owned form once they be-
come successful. It may be easier for the founders to avoid sharing
the returns due to their initial success with newcomers if the latter
are brought on as employees rather than as owners. Social-republi-
can accumulation constraints might mitigate this effect, but there is
no material incentive in conventional market circumstances for peo-
ple to adopt such constraints spontaneously. Again, there are ex-
amples of initially worker-owned firms in which the founders have
converted themselves into employers, 170 but not so many as to ac-
count for the small number of successful firms that have been
worker-owned even for an initial period.
A more promising, but as yet tentative explanation makes sev-
eral points.171 First, culturally dominant models of economic or-
ganization may have cognitively inhibited unbiased consideration
by investors of deviant forms. Consider, for example, the resistance
of American investors and managers to manufacturing methods
successfully adopted decades ago in Japan that substantially decen-
tralize responsibility to workers on the shop floor. In a few indus-
tries, notably automobiles, these methods recently have been proven
effective with American workers, though usually at the initiative of
Japanese investors and managers rather than American ones. Sec-
168. But see supra notes 55-58 & 88 and accompanying text.
169. See, e.g, L. GOODWYN, supra note 3, at 304 ("The highly successful multi-state
livestock marketing cooperative [established by midwestern affiliates of the Farmers'
Alliance] was killed by the simple decision of the Livestock Commission in Chicago to
refuse to deal with the farmer cooperative. The decision was justified on the ground
that the cooperative, in distributing profits to its membership, violated the 'anti-rebate'
rule of the Commission!").
170. See infra note 184.
171. See M. PIORE & C. SABEL, supra note 1; R. UNGER, supra note 1, at 585-86;
L. WEISS, CREATING CAPITALISM: THE STATE AND SMALL BUSINESS SINCE 1945
(1988); Levine & Tyson, Participation, Productivity, and the Firm's Environment, in
PAYING FOR PRODUCTIVITY, supra note 152, at 183-243.
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ond, the efficiency of small, internally egalitarian enterprise may re-
quire a special infrastructure of financial intermediation, technical
assistance, and cooperative production and marketing. Infrastruc-
ture of any kind is rarely provided through wholly private initiative,
and public efforts in the United States have been relatively insensi-
tive to the possibilities of small-scale, locally-rooted, human-capital-
intensive enterprise. Third, the viability of social-republican enter-
prise is enhanced by types of macroeconomic and regulatory poli-
cies that promote financial stability and full employment. Financial
stability benefits small enterprise by obviating the need for firms to
undertake stabilizing activities that involve scale economies (for ex-
ample, diversification), and, by increasing the market power of la-
bor, full employment decreases the efficacy of authoritarian labor
discipline and encourages investors to consider more egalitarian ap-
proaches to inducing worker cooperation. To the extent that plau-
sible economic policies that might have enhanced both stability and
employment levels have not been pursued, the failure to do so may
count as a partial explanation for the paucity of social-republican
enterprise. 
1 72
172. Two further explanations should be noted. First, workers may have cultural
and cognitive inclinations that cut against worker ownership. For example, there is
good reason to believe that the upbringing and education of working class Americans,
in comparison with those of upper class Americans, disproportionately emphasize obe-
dience and conformity rather than creativity and initiative. See, M. KOHN, CLASS AND
CONFORMITY: A STUDY IN VALUES (1969).
Second, the radically unequal distribution of capital cuts against the formation of
worker enterprises. Capital owners tend to have far more capital than they can profita-
bly employ in enterprises in which they work. Most workers have little capital of their
own and have difficulty collateralizing debt. Of course, moderate-income people do
establish a large number of (usually self-financed) businesses each year, and these busi-
nesses usually take the form of proprietorships or partnerships controlled by one or a
few worker-investors, not worker cooperatives that extend ownership to the entire
workforce. But if the number of workers able to make such investments is small as a
percentage of the workforce, and if they are dispersed throughout the society, then the
paucity of cooperatives may simply reflect the fact that would-be cooperators have diffi-
culty finding collaborators.
The policy implications of these explanations are different and perhaps more am-
biguous than the ones emphasized in the text. If considered undesirable, the cultural
and cognitive inclinations against worker ownership might be changed by educational
reform. The unequal distribution of capital could be addressed by global redistributive
efforts. The extent to which the access-to-capital point supports more focused efforts to
make capital available to would-be worker-owners is debatable. The prevailing distribu-
tion of capital is hard to defend from any political point of view. But given that distri-
bution, the problems of moral hazard and adverse selection that arise from the inability
of most workers to collateralize debt are real and would plague any credit program
grounded in purely redistributive considerations.
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However, from a social-republican point of view, the most im-
portant point is that no amount of evidence of private, individual
decisions can settle the issue of the desirability of such enterprise. If
one accepts the social-republican premise that the organization of
work is a constitutive political issue, then that issue becomes a mat-
ter for public, collective decisionmaking. This view would see the
question as one of collective second-order preference, a question
that concerns not a particular choice in the context of a given social
structure, but a decision about the kind of society we would like to
make ourselves. The market is incapable of expressing such
decisions.
173
In this respect, the issue of public support for employee enter-
prise ownership (or resident homeownership) is akin to the issue of
public support for the arts. In both respects, support expresses, less
a set of existing individual preferences (which are adequately served
by the market) or redistributive concerns (which could be more effi-
ciently pursued in other ways) than a shared ideal and an aspiration
to change the society so as to move it toward that ideal. At least as
relevant as the paucity of successful worker-owned firms in the ab-
sence of government subsidies is the apparent political popularity of
public support for them.
B. Equality and Exclusion
The final critique of social-republican property is that it
achieves equality only at the cost of exclusiveness. Any community
is potentially exclusive, but communities founded on social-republi-
can property may have a tendency toward greater exclusiveness
than those founded on classical liberal property. Social-republican
property gives people an economic stake that tends to bind them to
the community, but it also creates disincentives to the admission of
new members.
Liberals have often argued that consent to the norms and prac-
tice of the nation should be sufficient to entitle outsiders to admis-
sion and citizenship. 174 However, the more that admission and
citizenship entitle entrants to economic equality with their fellow
citizens, the more liberal admission policies entail drastic redistribu-
tion from old to new citizens. Social-republicans unprepared to ac-
cept this consequence-and traditionally few have been-must then
173. Elster elaborates a similar point in the languge of "externalities" and "free
rider" effects. See Elster, supra note 153, at 98-99, 104-05, 108-10.




choose between sacrificing their commitment to equality by admit-
ting new members without the economic prerequisites of citizenship
or restricting membership to those who can bring with them suffi-
cient wealth to secure their own economic independence.
Historically, the republican commitment to intrapolitical
equality has often been accompanied by an exclusiveness that leads
to relatively great toleration of extrapolitical inequality. The classi-
cal republics were founded on slavery and a variety of other
subordinated roles for noncitizens, and this fact was not lost on an-
tebellum American defenders of slavery who invoked republican
rhetoric as readily as abolitionists. In the social-republican vision of
the Jacksonian Democrats, a relatively radical vision of equality
among white males accompanied an intransigent commitment to
slavery and the exclusion of blacks and Native Americans from citi-
zenship. Precisely because social-republicans saw citizenship as so
thick with entitlement, they found it inconceivable that it could be
widely extended. By contrast, it has been said of Whigs with classi-
cal liberal views, "their acceptance of human inequality made them
more willing than Democrats to accord partial rights to blacks and
Indians." 175
Today one can see in several countries on the receiving end of
immigration streams some association between tolerance for ine-
quality and relatively open immigration policies. The relative liber-
ality of the United States in immigration matters seems a function
of its relatively high tolerance of inequality among citizens. Ameri-
can citizenship can be dispensed with some generosity in part be-
cause it entails relatively little in terms of economic rights. (And
even so, immigrants are screened to minimize the likelihood that
they will take great advantage of some of the economic rights that
are provided; reliance on public assistance is often disqualifying. 176)
On the other hand, countries like Sweden or Canada, where citizen-
ship entails relatively strong economic claims, have more restrictive
175. H. WATSON, LIBERTY AND POWER: THE POLITICS OF JACKSONIAN AMERICA
246 (1990).
The contemporary "republican revival" in constitutional law has attempted to
reformulate republicanism to give it a more inclusive and cosmopolitan tone. See, e.g.,
Michelman, Law's Republic, 97 YALE L.J. 1493 (1988). The success of this effort is
disputed. See, e.g., Bell & Bansal, supra note 144. For present purposes, it is sufficient
to note that the logic of social-republican property arrangements exhibits a tendency
toward exclusiveness that seems analogous to the one found in prerevival cultural
republicanism.
176. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(a)(8), (15) (1988).
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immigration policies. 177 The American labor movement's tradi-
tional opposition to liberal immigration has been based in part on
its moderately egalitarian wage and welfare commitments.1
78
Now consider the limited equity interests in real estate created
by rent control regimes. One of the political functions of these in-
terests is to anchor the citizen in the community by protecting her
from displacement due to property appreciation. However, prop-
erty appreciation typically reflects the desires of outsiders to enter
the community. Universal controls choke off new construction and
limit places for new entrants. Thus, the laws typically exempt new
units and allow them to rent at market rates. This, however, in-
troduces an inequality between new arrivals and oldtimers. New
renters will pay vastly more for their units than older renters pro-
tected by rent control. The same dilemma attends property tax
schemes that permit full reassessment only when the property is
sold. This approach protects older residents from the pressures of
property appreciation but only at the cost of introducing a severe
inequality between such residents and newcomers who must pay
higher taxes on comparable properties.1
79
The problem also arises in the context of the social-republican
business enterprise. Imagine an egalitarian enterprise composed of
nontransferable individual claims on collectively held capital. The
enterprise is successful; its value increases, and it can increase its
profits by expansion. In these circumstances, the members face a
dilemma. If they bring in new members on terms that preserve
equality, they redistribute away from themselves, since they must
177. See Comptroller General of the United States, Information on Immigration in
17 Countries 14-28, 84-89 (Jan. 12, 1979).
The current wholesale assimilation of the population of East Germany by West
Germany and the mass immigration of Russian Jews to Israel are exceptions that tend
to confirm the rule. Here the extension of citizenship in societies with relatively strong
egalitarian social commitments entails a radical economic redistribution in favor of the
new citizens, but it would be hard to imagine such assimilation apart from the unique
circumstances of pre-existing kinship between the old and new citizens.
178. See G. MINK, OLD LABOR AND NEW IMMIGRANTS IN AMERICAN POLITICAL
DEVELOPMENT 1890-1930, at 30-73, 117-49 (1986).
179. Chief Justice Bird would have found the preference for long-term residents in
California's Proposition 13 limited reassessment scheme unconstitutionally arbitrary,
but the rest of the California Supreme Court disagreed. Amador Valley Joint Union
High School Dist. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 22 Cal. 3d 208, 252-53, 583 P.2d 1281,
1302-08, 149 Cal. Rptr. 239, 260-65 (1978) (Bird, C.J., concurring and dissenting).
The dominant view seems to be that the federal constitution permits legislative tax
schemes to pursue republican equality at the expense of liberal equality. See Cohen,
State Law In Equality Clothing: A Comment on Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal Company v.
County Commission, 38 UCLA L. REV. 87 (1990).
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then allow new members to share in returns from capital they now
control.18 0 They will thus be tempted to expand in ways that pre-
serve for themselves the returns from the firm's capital but subvert
the social-republican character of the enterprise.
There are several ways of doing this. The old members can
charge new entrants a large admission fee (or sell them shares at
market value), as do most successful American producer coopera-
tives.181 They can give lower patronage returns to new entrants.j
2
They can forego internal expansion and spin off a separate firm to
produce supplies for them on terms that will involve lower returns
to workers in the spun-off enterprise. 183 Or the members can recon-
stitute themselves as capitalist employers and bring in the new en-
trants as employees, a practice of some American producer
cooperatives as well as cooperatives organized on more strictly so-
cial-republican lines in postrevolutionary Mexico, in Peru under the
Velasco regime, and in Chile under the Allende regime.' 84 The
most extreme response, of which there are many examples in Eu-
rope and America, is for the members to sell the enterprise to an
outside investor, pocket the proceeds, and themselves become,
along with the new entrants, employees. 18 5
180. In neoclassical theory, the egalitarian cooperative will expand only as long as a
new worker generates income above the pre-existing average income per worker. On
the other hand, the capitalist firm will expand as long as a new worker generates income
above the marginal cost of employing her. Given declining marginal labor products, the
cooperative will stop hiring at an earlier point than the comparable capitalist firm. See,
e.g., J. BONIN & L. PuT'TERMAN, supra note 114, at 13-18.
181. K. BERMAN, WORKER-OWNED PLYWOOD COMPANIES 194-96 (1967) (Pacific
Northwest plywood cooperatives); R. RUSSELL, supra note 96, at 75 (San Francisco
Bay Area garbage cooperatives), 123 (Los Angeles taxi cooperatives).
182. This would most likely take the form of an agreement by which the new worker
purchased a membership share from the firm on an installment basis (or the firm loaned
the worker the money to purchase the share) with the firm deducting the payments
from the worker's current compensation. This is the procedure at the Mondragon co-
operatives, Ellerman, supra note 98, and at some law firms, though in the former and
often the latter cases the purchase price is subsidized at a rate below the market value of
the share.
183. See Frank, supra note 135, at 567-68 (speculating that mainstream enterprises
use this procedure to constrain intrafirm wage inequality).
184. E. GREENBERG, WORKPLACE DEMOCRACY: THE POLITICAL EFFECTS OF
PARTICIPATION 60, 188 (1986) (16% to 36% of workers at Pacific Northwest plywood
cooperatives studied in late 1960s were employees); C. MCCLINTOCK, PEASANT COOP-
ERATIVES AND POLITICAL CHANGE IN PERU 319-42 (1981) (examples from Mexico,
Peru, and Chile); R. RUSSELL, supra note 96, at 97-98 (garbage cooperatives), 119, 124
(taxi cooperatives).
185. K. BERMAN, supra note 181, at 85-92, 93-98 (plywood cooperatives); R. RUS-
SELL, supra note 96, at 100 (garbage cooperatives). Sidney and Beatrice Webb argued
that successful cooperatives would inevitably self-destruct either by selling out to out-
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An ambitious social-republican regime will respond to these
threats of corruption, as Yugoslavia did, by prohibiting unequal
treatment of new members. But the result of such a prohibition is
likely to be exclusion: the incumbents can simply limit or forego
expansion in order to preserve for themselves the returns from their
capital.
When the group does admit new members, how will it decide
which members to take? Since membership in a successful social-
republican institution t3pically will carry rewards with an economic
value greater than the entry price, there will be a surplus of prospec-
tive qualified entrants. One would expect that the members, if per-
mitted, would rank prospective entrants in terms of personal
qualities the members value. Should they be permitted to do so?
Here the social-republican tradition is ambiguous. Radical social-
republicans like Thomas Skidmore have occasionally argued for al-
location of social-republican property by the state on lines of strict
equality. 186 But the most salient mode of allocation in the republi-
can tradition is on the basis of consanguinity through inheritance.
Inheritance plays a prominent role in, for example, Harrington's
program. 1 7 In general, social-republican institutions have often
been associated with property allocation practices involving nepo-
tism, ethnocentrism, racism, and sexism.
American immigration policy was for many decades openly ra-
cist, ranking prospective entrants on the basis of judgments of racial
superiority. More recently, the most important preferences have
been for relatives of American citizens. While such nepotism is
generally not considered problematic for immigration decisions, it
would be for decisions about interests in housing, voluntary associa-
tions, and productive enterprises.
Many believe that an important factor in the survival of the
cooperative housing form among upper-income owners has been its
superior ability to facilitate various forms of discrimination in the
selection of new entrants. 188 Unlike the rental form, the co-op gives
incumbent members the power to select new ones, and in contrast
to the condominium form, the co-op's cross-collateralization feature
siders or by bringing in new members as employees. For their argument with numerous
European examples, see S. WEBB & B. WEBB, Special Supplement on Co-operative Pro-
duction and Profit-Sharing, in II THE NEW STATESMAN 1 (1914).
186. See P. CONKIN, supra note 17, at 237-40.
187. See J. HARRINGTON, supra note 21, at 236-38.
188. See Hansmann, Condominium and Cooperative Housing: Transactional Effi-
ciency, Tax Subsidies, and Tenure Choice, 20 J. LEG. STUD. 25, 31-32 (1991).
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gives residents both an incentive for discrimination on financial
grounds and a pretext for discrimination on other, illegal grounds.
Rent-controlled housing units are typically allocated to relatives or
friends of landlords or departing tenants. In homeowners' associa-
tions, alienation restraints--"restrictive covenants"-were once
practically synonymous with racial segregation.189
Ethnic homogeneity is a notable feature of the Mondragon co-
operatives and of some American ones aswell. 19° The admission
practices of American craft unions, once bastions of social-republi-
can ideology, were until recently flagrantly nepotistic, enthnocen-
tric, racist, and sexist (and are still often tacitly so).191
Indeed, social-republican economic organization has occasion-
ally appealed to colonialist projects of ethnic and economic domina-
tion. European colonial powers desiring to consolidate control of
colonies by establishing permanent settlements of their own people
have found that capitalist enterprises have their drawbacks, espe-
cially their tendency to permit native labor to underbid and displace
European wage-earners. Land grants to Europeans, conditioned on
residence and cultivation and subject to alienation restraints, have
thus appealed to colonizers as a way of creating stable European
settlements abroad. Gershon Shafir has recently interpreted the ori-
gins of the Israeli kibbutz in the light of such colonial practices. In
his view, the Zionist movement adopted the social-republican ideal
of an enterprise owned in common by its workers in response to the
difficulties of inducing permanent Jewish migration to Palestine and
to the demands of the nascent Israeli labor movement for exclusive
access to jobs created by Jewish investment; in other words, the ap-
peal of the kibbutz was, in part, that it facilitated the exclusion of
Arabs from Jewish enterprise.
192
189. See Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948). For a rich treatment of the problem
of exclusion in the context of residential associations, see Alexander, Dilemmas of
Group Autonomy: Residential Associations and Community, 75 CORNELL L. REv. I
(1989).
190. On the significance of Basque culture for the Mondragon cooperatives, see W.
WHY'rE & K. WHYTE, supra note 98, at 254-65. Russell's account of the decline of
cooperative organization in a San Francisco garbage disposal company emphasizes the
common Italian backgrounds of the founders, their recruitment of new entrants
through family ties for decades, then the declining willingness of young Italian family
members to take jobs as garbage men, and the cleavages and tensions that arose when
the enterprise was compelled to recruit from among blacks and Latinos. R. RUSSELL,
supra note 96, at 92-94.
191. See W. GOULD, BLACK WORKERS IN WHITE UNIONS 281-96 (1977).
192. G. SHAFIR, LAND, LABOR, AND THE ORIGINS OF THE ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN
CONFLICT, 1882-1914, at 75-78, 146-86 (1989). The property laws of indigenous peo-
ples such as the American Indians are less troubling examples of the association of
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Of course, the cruder forms of ethnic, race, and gender dis-
crimination are forbidden in America by the civil rights laws. Even
to the extent such laws are enforced, however, they leave a broad
range of latitude for discrimination based on ascriptive qualities
that are troubling. One response to such concerns would be to leg-
islate tight constraints on entry decisions. The most extreme and
effective way to preclude discrimination would be to have new en-
trants determined by queueing or lottery. 193 The composition of the
queue or the lottery pool could be determined by some independent
state agency in accordance with limited criteria of minimum suita-
bility for membership in the institution (e.g., evidence of responsible
prior conduct and, in the case of productive enterprises, relevant
skills). When openings occurred, the agency could allocate them
within the class so determined to those who had waited the longest
or by lot. Such procedures are commonly used to allocate publicly
subsidized housing units. Although they are not currently used in
connection with rent controlled housing or subsidized enterprises,
they probably could be.
There is, however, a strong social-republican objection to limit-
ing incumbents' power to select new members in this way. The ten-
dency to selectivity is not a mere side-effect of social-republican
property; it is a function of the voluntariness and cohesion implicit
in the social-republican ideal of community. As Michael Walzer
writes of producer cooperatives, "Once a commune has been estab-
lished, what is really at stake is the admission of new members ....
[If the members] cannot choose their co-workers, it is difficult to see
in what sense they can be said to 'control' their workplace." Thus
the members should be permitted to choose new entrants on the
basis not only of "ability to do the job," but also of "the sense they
have of [a] common life."
194
I find this point overstated. It is true that social-republican
institutions require a sense of community, or "common life," but it
is not at all clear that this sense has to pre-exist the formation of the
institution or each new member's admission to it. Indeed, institu-
tions left free to choose their own members often seem to mistake
mere ethnic or surface similarity for the deeper understandings and
associations of community. In such institutions, exclusivity often
social-republican property arrangements with efforts to strengthen ethnically-bounded
communities. See McChesney, supra note 12, at 312-15.
193. See Greely, The Equality of Allocation by Lot, 12 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV.
113 (1977).
194. M. WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE 162 (1983).
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seems associated with shallowness rather than depth of communal
relations. Walzer's point that admission of new members is the cen-
tral political focus seems true of such institutions precisely because
their limited sense of shared purpose does not provide a basis for a
richer collective agenda. At the same time, diverse individuals
thrown together by chance in circumstances where they have strong
incentives to cooperate-the military combat unit is the archetypal
example in American culture-often develop strong communal
bonds.
Social-republican property draws on the logic of this latter phe-
nomenon. Its defining features are individual rights that can only
be enjoyed through membership in the institution. Such rights are
incentives for people to develop a "sense of a common life" that
may compensate for the relative lack of a pre-existing one. Thus,
the members' power to choose new entrants may be less important
to social-republican institutions than to others.
It is one thing to require an institution that has decided to ex-
pand to give up the power to choose new members or share it with
an independent agency or an impersonal process; it is another to
take from the institution the power to decide when and how many
new members to admit. We have seen that, if social-republican en-
terprises are free to determine the size of their membership, success-
ful ones will expand less rapidly than comparable capitalist ones. 195
This tendency will exacerbate the inequality between relatively suc-
cessful and relatively unsuccessful enterprises.
Thus, there is a case for social control, not only of the designa-
tion of new members, but of the size of the enterprise. One example
of an effort of this sort is the New Jersey Supreme Court's Mount
Laurel decision holding unconstitutional various "exclusionary
zoning" practices and requiring the accommodation of low income
housing construction. 96 Or consider the Associated Press case in
which the United States Supreme Court found the news consor-
tium's practice of limiting admission to one newspaper in each lo-
cality violated the Sherman Act and ordered the consortium to
admit prospective entrants on nondiscriminatory terms.197
195. See supra note 180.
196. Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 92 N.J.
158, 456 A.2d 390 (1983).
197. Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945). Commentators differ
about whether this case involved the forced sharing of enterprise-specific capital, see R.
POSNER & F. EASTERBROOK, ANTITRUST 768-69 (2d ed. 1981), or simply the prohibi-
tion of an exclusion motivated solely by anticompetitive purposes, see H. HOVENKAMP,
ECONOMICS AND FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAW 283-85 (1985).
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Another approach to the problem of interenterprise inequality
that is at least superficially more consistent with enterprise auton-
omy is free or subsidized entry of new enterprises to compete with
the more successful older ones.198
However, carried far enough to resolve the problem of exclu-
sion, either forced admission or subsidized entry would amount to a
repudiation of the social-republican ideal. As membership in the
institution were forcibly expanded, the value of individual social-
republican claims would decline and ultimately disappear. While
some competitive entry is needed to spur innovation and level large
rents, too much competitive entry will threaten the organizational
capital that sustains flexible cooperation and long term investments.
One social-republican mechanism that may tend to dilute this
problem is federation of independent enterprises engaged in mutual
insurance. The "joint note" cross-collateralization procedure of the
Farmer's Alliance is one example. The Mondragon system in
which the earnings of the various federated cooperatives are pooled
and partly leveled is another. 199 Such practices reduce inequalities
across affiliated enterprises. Obviously, however, they do not bene-
fit nonmembers, and such federations would not readily accept new
members with below average earnings prospects.
Moreover, such federations are susceptible to two sorts of
pathologies. They can become powerful forces for acquiring and
exercising monopoly power and for exerting pressure on the state
for favors, as both the federated enterprises of American farmers
and the associations of proprietors of the communally held ejido
land in Mexico illustrate. 2°° Alternatively, in their efforts to con-
strain member inequality or to achieve coordination, these federa-
tions can so restrict the conduct of their members as to undermine
their autonomy. This seems to have been the case in Yugoslavia
with the system of inter-enterprise "social compacts" (reinforced by
the role of the party and the state) introduced in 1974.201
198. This approach is prominent in the market socialist literature. See, e.g., J.
VANEK, supra note 119, at 386-87.
199. Ronald Gilson and Robert Mnookin have interpreted the "lock step" seniority
compensation practice of some corporate law firms as a form of intra-enterprise mutual
insurance of this type. Gilson & Mnookin, supra note 96, at 341-46.
200. See G. MCCONNELL, THE DECLINE OF AGRARIAN DEMOCRACY 69-85
(1953); M. PIORE, BIRDS OF PASSAGE: MIGRANT LABOR AND INDUSTRIAL SOCIETIES
124 (1979).
201. C. PROUT, supra note 10, at 48-81. Ellen Comisso has suggested that the Yu-
goslav system is prone to oscillate in cycles of decentralization in response to productiv-
ity problems and recentralization in response to growing inter-enterprise inequality. E.
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In some respects, the dialectic of internal and external equality
is inherent in any democratic vision that makes room for decentral-
ized collective self-organization. For example, the resistance to or-
ganizational expansion noted by critics of the Yugoslav model can
also be found in the behavior of unions under social-democratic re-
gimes. Unionized workers can share in the returns to firm-specific
capital and thus have incentives similar to cooperative members to
resist expansion that would bring in new members who would dilute
these returns. In'the union context, this takes the form of insistence
on high wage levels that can be expected to induce employers to set
employment at relatively low levels or "two-tier" wage scales that
pay new employees at different rates than incumbent ones. More
broadly, it takes the form of a "dual labor market" in which the
institutions that provide security for the better off workers in the
organized sector lower the wages or increase the insecurity of work-
ers in the unorganized sector. Literature in the social-democratic
vein has recently emphasized these difficulties and suggested that
their solution requires more inclusive and centralized union
structures. 2
02
Recognizing the difficulty common to social-republican and
more mainstream institutional arrangements might lead one to con-
clude that the problem of internal versus external inequality is not
distinctive to the social-republican view, but represents a pervasive
"dilemma of industrial democracy." 20 3 Nevertheless, the dilemma
seems especially salient for the social-republican view because of its
relatively central commitment to equality and decentralized organi-
zation. The plausible argument of recent social democratic litera-
ture that issues of inter-enterprise equity require centralized
organization should trouble social-republicans. Certainly, the fail-
ure to elaborate responses to these issues is a central failing of much
social-republican literature.
CONCLUSION
Social-republican property is neither as anomalous nor as im-
plausible as the dominant mainstream conceptions of property often
suggest. In a variety of contexts, it probably has a valuable role to
play in connection with public subsidies for housing and business
COMISSO, WORKERS' CONTROL UNDER PLAN AND MARKET (1979). This is an in-
stance of the "Communist reform cycle." R. UNGER, supra note 1, at 49-51.
202. See Rogers, Divide and Conquer: Further "Reflections on the Distinctive Char-
acter of American Labor Laws," 1990 Wis. L. REV. 1.
203. M. AOKI, supra note 152, at 56.
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development. This role is to encourage enterprise democracy and
to prevent the private appropriation of the subsidies. Social-repub-
lican property could play this role either in the form of explicit
transfer and accumulation restraints, or in the form of the implicit
restraints associated with enterprises distinctively constituted by
"firm specific human capital," or both.
But vindicating the democratic aspirations associated with this
type of property will require attention to the problem of exclusion.
The problem can be addressed either through constraints on admis-
sion and expansion decisions by established enterprises or through
subsidizing new competing institutions. Either approach, however,
could threaten the vitality of social-republican institutions. The
critical task is to design constraints on exclusion without excessively
impairing the autonomy and security necessary for such institutions
to flourish.
